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"[Clonstant vigilance and activity by committees on unauthorized
practice of law are essential lest we have a repetition of the
encroachment in the professional field by 'legal bootleggers,'
which took place during the first World War. ,
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the early twentieth century, the organized bar2 has
sought to protect the legal profession from encroachment by
nonlawyers engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 3 Scholars
have noted that the organized bar, and particularly the American Bar
Association ("ABA"), made a concerted effort to curb the
unauthorized practice of law in the 1930s and 40s by filing lawsuits
that sought to have the courts enjoin and punish those engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. 4 It is correct that the efforts of the
organized bar to curb the unauthorized practice of law reached their
apex during that time frame; however, those efforts were not the

organized bar's first campaign to curtail the unauthorized practice of
law.
The organized bar first focused on curbing the unauthorized
practice of law in the 1920s and, at that time, its main strategy was to
lobby state legislatures to enact definitions of the practice of law.5 The

1. Edwin M. Otterbourg et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 68 A.B.A. REPORTS 242 (1943).
2. The term "organized bar" in this paper is used to refer to local, state and
national organized bar associations comprised of voluntary members. The main
focus in this article is the efforts of the ABA; however, other regional bar
associations were engaged in similar efforts and are also discussed.
3. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part III.A which discusses the organized bar's strategy to curb the
unauthorized practice of law in the 1920s. The unauthorized practice of law, as used
in this article, includes both the practice of law by nonlawyers, as well as the
practice of law through corporate entities, many of which utilized lawyers to provide
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bar hoped to use these statutes as an enforcement mechanism against
nonlawyers who engaged in activities that constituted the
unauthorized practice of law. 6 The organized bar did not appear to
question whether or not the legislatures possessed the power to define
the practice of law. Instead, the organized bar appears to have
assumed that the legislatures had this power as part of their police
powers, which allow them to regulate a variety of professions. 7 This
legislative campaign, however, was not successful-very few state
legislatures enacted a definition of the practice of law during the
8
1920s.
By the mid-1920s, the organized bar's legislative reform efforts
waned. 9 There is evidence to suggest that the organized bar was
concerned about its lobbying efforts being countered by the lobbying
efforts of other interest groups, such as title companies and realtors,
which could have had a deleterious effect on the organized bar's
proposed definition of the practice of law. 10 There is also evidence to
suggest that, even though legislatures were largely made up of
lawyers, not all lawyers shared the views of the organized bar and the
state legislatures were not necessarily a friendly forum for the
organized bar's lobbying efforts.1 1
In the 1930s, the organized bar renewed its efforts to curb the
unauthorized practice of law. 12 After the start of the Great Depression,
the legal profession's income fell dramatically.' 3 The organized bar
attributed this not only to the economic pressures of the time, but also
to the overcrowding of the profession and to competition from

those services.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 148-54.
7. Cf. Chenoweth v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 141 P. 132, 133 (Colo. 1913)
("[U]nder the police power inherent in the state, the Legislature may enact
reasonable regulations for the examination and registration of physicians, in the
practice of medicine and surgery. ..").
8. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 172-79.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 217, 233-34.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 195-98; see also infra note 199.
12. See infra Part III.B which discusses the organized bar's efforts to curb the
unauthorized practice of law in the 1930s.
13. See infra text accompanying note 191.
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nonlawyers. 14 These reasons were a driving force behind the revival of
the organized bar's interest in the unauthorized practice of law in the
1930s.'1 Much of the bar's rhetoric, however, was focused on
improving the integrity of the bar and protecting the public from
unqualified practitioners. 16 The purportedly injured public, however,
frequently perceived the attempts of attorneys to consolidate these
powers into the judicial branch as self-motivated and anti-competitive
efforts. 7
The organized bar's renewed focus on the unauthorized practice
of law in the 1930s did not seek to have the legislature define the
practice of law as it did in the 1920s. 18 Instead, the organized bar
shifted its strategy. It moved from lobbying for legislative reform to
litigating, filing hundreds of lawsuits against individuals and
corporations allegedly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 19
It also moved from seeking a definition of the practice of law to
arguing that it was unwise to try to define the practice of law.2 ° To this
end, the organized bar moved from asking legislatures to define the
practice of law to arguing that it was unconstitutional for the
legislatures to do so and contending that only the judicial departments
of government have the power to define the practice of law. 21 In other
words, its strategic shift sought to remove the power to define the
practice of law from the democratic process of the legislative branch
and to put it into the hands of the courts on a case-by-case basis. This
change in strategy was successful and the organized bar's arguments
were overwhelmingly adopted in the decisional law of the 1930s and
22
40s.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 184-91.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 202-06.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 211, 227-28.
17. See infra text accompanying note 229.
18. See infra text accompanying note 210.
19. See infra Part III.B which discusses the organized bar's strategy to curb the
unauthorized practice of law in the 1930s.
20. See infra Part III.B which discusses the organized bar's strategy to curb the
unauthorized practice of law in the 1930s.
21. See infra Part III.B which discusses the organized bar's strategy to curb the
unauthorized practice of law in the 1930s.
22. E.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941, 945
(I11. 1937) (holding that the General Assembly has no right to authorize a nonlawyer
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The result of this strategic shift was the expansion of the courts'
inherent powers to regulate the legal profession, which prevails
today.2 3 No state constitution explicitly grants any judicial branch the
power to define the practice of law. 24 The state supreme courts,
however, have reasoned that their power to define the practice of law
originates from the separation of powers doctrine delineated in the
state constitutions and the inherent powers they consider necessary to
operate as an independent branch of government. 25 The inherent
to appear in a representative capacity before the Industrial Commission because
"[t]he General Assembly has no authority to grant a layman the right to practice
law."); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 575 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (holding that the
court's inherent powers include the power to define the practice of law); R.I. Bar
Ass'n v. Auto. Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. 139, 142 (R.I. 1935) (holding that "[a]uthority to
admit to the bar and to disbar necessarily carries with it power to define what
constitutes the [unauthorized] practice of law"). But see Eagle Indem. Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 217 Cal. 244, 247-48 (1933) (holding that the Legislature did
have the authority to permit nonlawyers to appear before the Industrial Accident
Commission).
23. See, e.g., State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 104 (Conn. 2008); Dayton Supply
& Tool Co. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Revision, 856 N.E.2d 926, 937 (Ohio
2006); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 827 N.E.2d 422, 429 (11. 2005).
24. It is worth noting, however, that several modem state constitutions provide
that the judicial branch has the power to regulate the practice of law, including the
admission and disbarment of attorneys. E.g., FL CONST. art. V, § 15 ("The supreme
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the
practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."); KY CONST. § 116 ("The
Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern admission to the bar and the discipline of
members of the bar."); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3 ("The Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of
persons admitted."); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("The supreme court shall have
authority . .. to promulgate rules and regulations for the admission to practice,
conduct, disciplining, and disbarment of attorneys at law."). Courts have construed
these provisions as granting them the power to define the practice of law. E.g., Fagas
v. Scott, 597 A.2d 571, 591 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (suggesting that the
court's constitutional power to make rules regarding the practice of law and the
admission to the practice of law includes the exclusive power to define the practice
of law).
25. E.g., Frye v. Tenderloin Hous. Clinic, Inc., 129 P.3d 408, 424 (Cal. 2006)
(discussing court's inherent responsibility and authority over the core functions of
admission and discipline of attorneys); Denver Bar Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
391 P.2d 467, 470 (Colo. 1964) (holding that the supreme court has the exclusive
power to define and regulate the practice of law by virtue of the constitutional
provision distributing the powers of government; there is no authority in these
respects in the legislative or executive departments); In re Nenno, 472 A.2d 815,
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powers doctrine derives from the idea that upon the creation of the
26
courts, "power sprang into being independent of any written law."
Courts have reasoned that these inherent powers are necessary for the
court "to protect itself against any action that would unreasonably
curtail its powers or materially impair its efficiency., 27 As a result of
the efforts of the organized bar in the 1930s and 40s, courts began to
hold that they have the inherent and exclusive power to define the
28
practice of law.
Following the precedents established in the 1930s and 40s, today
most state judicial branches assert that the power to regulate the legal
29
profession is a power that resides in their branch of government.
819 (Del. 1983) (holding that the supreme court has the responsibility for
interpreting its rules implementing aspects of the court's exclusive right to govern
the practice of law; "[t]his principle is immutable. It inheres in and derives from the
very nature of the doctrine of separation of powers.").
26. State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 605 (Wis. 1928).
27. Id. at 604 (quoting In re Courtroom & Officers of Fifth Branch Circuit
Court, Milwaukee County, 134 N.W. 490, 495 (1912)); see also In re Cate, 273 P.
617, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928) (reasoning that inherent powers of the courts derive
from the constitution). By the 1800s courts used the inherent powers doctrine as a
rationale for their contempt powers. See, e.g., Hale v. State, 45 N.E. 199, 200 (Ohio
1896) (holding that courts have inherent contempt powers that do not require any
express constitutional or legislative grant of power). For articles discussing the
inherent powers doctrine, see generally: Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of
the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An HistoricalAnalysis, 32 BUFF. L.
REV. 525 (1983); Charles Beardsley, The JudicialClaim to Inherent Power Over the
Bar, 19 A.B.A. J. 509 (1933); Henry M. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the
Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635 (1935); Louis Shanfeld, The Scope of Judicial
Independence of the Legislature in Matters of Procedure and Control of the Bar, 19
ST. Louis L. REV. 163 (1934); Charles W. Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public
Participationin Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1978);
Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the
Inherent Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1989-90); Comment,
Control of the UnauthorizedPractice of Law: Scope of Inherent JudicialPower,28
U. CHI. L. REV. 162 (1960); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate
the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1976). See
also Robert J. Martineau & Samuel D. Conti, Regulation of the Legal Profession:
The Relationship Between Judicial and Legislative Power, (Report prepared for the
National Center for State Courts Northeastern Regional Office) (1987).
28. See infra Part III.B-C.
29. E.g., Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 977 (2002) (holding that, under Arizona law, the judiciary has the
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.); In re Brown, 708 N.W.2d 251,
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They also typically assert that their power to regulate the legal
profession includes the power to determine what constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law and, concomitantly, the power to define
the practice of law. 30 The result of these holdings is that most
legislative branches of state government cannot define what acts
constitute, or do not constitute, the practice of law. 3 1 Thus, unlike
other professions that the legislatures regulate, such as the medical
profession which is stratified into different types of professionals with
different levels of training and costs to consumers-doctors, nurse
practitioners, chiropractors, physician's assistants, etc.-the legal
profession has largely evolved such that only lawyers may provide
32
legal services.
The shift in the organized bar's strategy, and the timing of the
shift, raises the question of whether the courts' inherent power to
define the practice of law has a solid mandate from state constitutions
and the separation of powers doctrine, or whether the power
developed to serve protectionist interests of a private trade group-the
bar-which had the cooperation of judiciary due to their shared
membership in the legal profession. In other words, the doctrine may
have developed not because the legislatures lacked the power to define
the practice of law, but because the organized bar was concerned
about how the legislatures would use that power during a time of
economic stagnation.
This article suggests that the judicial branches of state government
may have overreached by holding in the 1930s and 40s that the state
legislatures did not have the constitutional power to define the practice
256 (Neb. 2006) ("The Nebraska Supreme Court is vested with the sole power to
admit persons to the practice of law in [that] state and to fix qualifications for
admission to the Nebraska bar.").
30. E.g., Neal v. Wilson, 873 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Ark. 1994) ("The power to
regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the judicial department as
one of the divisions of government."); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of
Supreme Court of Colo. v. Employers Unity, Inc., 716 P.2d 460, 463 (Colo. 1986)
("The Colorado Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to define and to regulate
the practice of law."); State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 131
A.2d 646, 656 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957) ("The power to regulate, control and define
the practice of law reposes in the judicial department.").
31. See cases cited supra note 22.
32. There are a few exceptions to this, particularly in the federal system. See
infra text accompanying notes 284-87.
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of law. These holdings arose from the efforts of the organized bar,
which may have been more motivated by fears of competing lobbying
groups than by legitimate constitutional constraints on the legislatures'
power. This body of decisional law put the development of the legal
profession on a trajectory that may not ultimately be in the best
interest of consumers of legal services.
Part I of this article gives a brief historical overview of the early
development of the separation of powers doctrine in the first state
constitutions and how the early state constitutions allocated the power
to regulate the legal profession. Part II examines the development of
the inherent powers doctrine with respect to the regulation of the legal
profession around the turn of the nineteenth century, which set the
stage for the doctrine to expand to the courts' power to define the
practice of law. Part III of this article traces how the organized bar
shifted its strategy from lobbying for legislation to define the practice
of law in the 1920s, to litigating in the 1930s and arguing that it is
unwise to try to define the practice of law and, furthermore,
unconstitutional for the legislatures to do so. Part IV of this article
examines the conclusion that the judicial departments must have the
power to define the practice of law in order to maintain their status as
an independent branch of government. Lastly, Part V briefly looks at
the modern implications of delegating the power to define the practice
of law to the judicial branches of state governments. This section
suggests that modern legal reform efforts should consider challenging
precedents that have held there is a constitutional basis for the
judiciary to claim the exclusive power to define the practice of law.
The main opponent to such challenges would be the organized bar.
This section further suggests that the organized bar should reconsider
its position on such issues.
I.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
AND THE REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS

The balance of power between the judicial and legislative
branches with respect to the regulation of the legal profession has not
been fixed over time. Prior to the American Revolution, there were no
distinct branches of government and the regulation of attorneys
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spanned both judicial and legislative bodies. 33 After the Revolution,
most colonies enacted constitutions that framed a government
34
consisting of separate branches with distinct and separate powers.
However, early constitutions did not usually delineate which branch of
government should regulate the legal profession. 3 5 The supremacy of
the judicial branches over the regulation of the legal profession
36
developed over time and mainly through decisional law.
A. Colonial Times and the Regulation of the Legal Profession
37
Lawyering was not a welcome vocation in early Colonial times.
Colonies such as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania relied heavily on
the clergy to administrate justice and did not see a need for a judiciary
in their early history. 38 Even those colonies that were not intertwined
with the clergy looked unfavorably on lawyers. 39 Attorneys in
Colonial times had no requirements for training, admissions, or
standards of conduct; therefore, those who held themselves out as
lawyers frequently were considered to be "sharpers, pettifoggers and
spellbinders," and often rightfully so. 40 During the early Colonial
times, there were initially no schools to train lawyers. 4 ' Even as
schools started to be established, it was not at all uncommon for one to
42
hold himself out as an attorney after receiving little formal training.

33.

1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 22-23

(1965).
34. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part II.
37.

See generally CHARLES WARREN, A

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR

4-8

(1911) (discussing hostilities toward the legal profession during Colonial times and
the possible reasons for such attitudes).
38. CHROUST, supra note 33, at 28-29, 207; see also Roscoe Pound, The Lay
Tradition as to the Lawyer, 12 MICH. L. REv. 627, 632-36 (1913-14) (discussing the

history of the administration of justice, which began in the hands of the clergy, and
theorizing that the clergy did not relinquish the practice of law without a protest).
39. See CHROUST, supra note 33, at 191. Public hearings were held in New
York in 1768 on the question of "'Whether a Lawyer could possibly be an honest
Man,' and apparently too many ... citizens [believed] not." Id.
40. ld. at 27, 117.
41. Id. at 29.
42. See id. at 30-39.
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In response to the low status of the attorney, the colonies regularly
used statutes as a means to regulate the legal profession and frequently
in ways that obstructed the profession.43 Some of the colonies enacted
statutes that required those who appeared in court on behalf of another
to be approved by that court and to take an oath.44 The oaths were
adopted in hopes of eliminating pettifoggers.45 The early acts and
statutes that provided for admission upon the taking of an oath were
focused on attorneys' activities in the courts; they did not address the
practice of law in other contexts. For example, Pennsylvania adopted
the following Act for Establishing Courts of Judicature in 1722, which
provided:
That there may be a competent number of persons of an honest
disposition, and learned in the law, admitted by the justices of
the... respective courts, to practice as attorneys there, who shall
behave themselves justly and faithfully in their practice....
[A]ttorneys, so admitted, may practice in all the courts of 46this
government, without any further or other license or admittance.

43. See generally WARREN, supra note 37, at 26, 29, 41-43; ROSCOE POUND,
THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 136-38 (1953) (discussing early

legislation that was hostile to the legal profession).
44. See, e.g., 5 THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT PUBLIC RECORDS (1706-1716)

48 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., AMS Press, Inc. & Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1870)
(requiring "[t]hat no person, except in his own case, shall be admitted to make any
plea at the bar, without being first approved of by the court before whom the plea is
to be made, nor until he shall take in the said court the following oath .... ).
45. See CHROUST, supra note 33, at 85 (discussing the oath adopted in
Massachusetts in 1686 that adopted the attorney's oath that had been used in
England since 1402 or 1403). The oath contained early ethical obligations to:
Swear That you will Do no falsehood nor deceit nor shall Consent to any
to be done in this Court and if you know of any to be done you shall give
knowledge thereof to the Judge of this Court for the time being or some
other of his Majestyes Councill or assistants of this Court that it may be
reformed.
Id. at 85-86.
46. Act for Establishing Courts of Judicature, ch. 255, sec. 15 (1722), in 3 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682-1801, at 308 (Comp. by James
T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders, Harrisburg, Clarence M. Busch, State Printer of
Pennsylvania 1896). Other jurisdictions adopted similar provisions. See, e.g., THE
FIRST LAWS OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES: 1 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE 132-33 (John D. Cushing ed., Michael Glazier, Inc. 1981).
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The colonies' negative attitudes towards attorneys also led to
statutory efforts to try to restrict the proliferation of attorneys,
including statutes that: outright prohibited anyone from appearing in
court as an attorney on behalf of another; 4 7 prohibited the payment of
attorneys' fees; 4 8 restricted fees to set amounts; 49 prohibited certain
people from engaging in the practice of law;5 0 and restricted the
number of attorneys in the colony. 5 1 Some colonies eventually
47. 2 THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT PUBLIC RECORDS (1665-1678) 59
(Charles J. Hoadly ed., AMS Press, Inc. & Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1852)
(prohibiting attorneys from appearing on behalf of another who "is charged and
prosecuted for delinquency," and providing that those who do so shall be fined "ten
shillings . . . or sit in stocks one hour for every such offense.").
48. See, e.g., Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, § 26, as reprinted in
SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
1606-1775, at 77 (William MacDonald ed., London, MacMillan 1899). This law
prohibited attorneys' fees and stated that:
Every man that findeth himselfe unfit to plead his owne cause in any
Court, shall have Libertie to imploy any man against whom the Court doth
not except, to helpe him, Provided he give him noe fee, or reward for his
paines. This shall not exempt the partie him selfe from Answering such
Questions in person as the Court shall thinke meete to demand of him.
[sic]
Id. Massachusetts eventually allowed attorneys to appear on behalf of others in court
in 1673, but subsequent acts restricted attorneys' fees. CHROUST, supra note 33, at
79-80, 85. Virginia also at one point prohibited any attorney from pleading in any
court of judicature "for any kind of reward or profitt whatsoever." 1 HENING, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM

THE FIRST SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 482 (Univ. Press of
Va. Charlottesville ed., 1969) (1823).
49. See, e.g., CHROUST, supra note 33, at 71-72, 85, 117-19, 139-40, 159-60,
199-200, 270-71 (discussing restrictions and prohibitions on attorneys' fees
throughout various colonies); 1 ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE
OF NEW JERSEY FROM [1703-1752] 338-52 (Samuel Neville ed., n.p., William
Bradford 1752) (comprehensive act regulating the practice of law and lawyers'
fees); 1ENING, supra note 48, at 275-76, 302 (restricting attorneys' fees to a
maximum of twenty pounds of tobacco on the County Court and fifty pounds in the
Quarter Court).
50. See, e.g., CHROUST, supra note 33, at 197 (citing GRANTS, CONCESSIONS
AND ORIGINAL CONSTrTUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 120 (1676
statute), 343 (1694 statute) (A. Learning and J. Spicer eds., Philadelphia, 1758) for
two statutes that "barr[ed] justices of the peace, sheriffs, deputies, clerks, and even
messengers of attorneys from engaging in the practice of law.").
51. Connecticut found that "many persons of late have taken upon them to be
attourneys at the bar, so that quarrels and lawsuits are multiplied, and the King's

76
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imposed a licensure requirement, although sometimes it was the
52
governor, not the courts, which held the power to grant licenses.
While the various oath requirements and fee or appearance
prohibitions were contained in statutes and acts, it is important to note
that during early Colonial times the functions of the courts and
legislatures were frequently contained within one governmental
body. 53 There were, therefore, no issues to grapple with regarding
which branch of government had the power to regulate the profession
at this juncture in history. Also, while the regulation of the legal
profession was beginning to develop during this time period, the focus
was on court appearances; the unauthorized practice of law and how
to define the practice of law do not seem to have been issues at this
time.54

good subjects disturbed," and in response it passed an Act that restricted the number
of attorneys in the colony of Connecticut to eleven. 7 THE COLONY OF
CONNECTICUT PUBLIC RECORDS (1726-1735) 279 (Charles J. Hoadly ed., AMS

Press, Inc. & Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1873). That Act was repealed fifteen
months later. Id. at 358. New Hampshire enacted a similar Act Relating to Attorneys
in 1714. CHROUST, supra note 33, at 130. And Delaware also enacted a similar
provision in 1797. THE FIRST LAWS OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, LAWS OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE 56 (John D. Cushing ed., Michael Glazier Inc. 1981).

52. CHROUST, supra note 33, at 157-58. In New York, the power to disbar,
suspend and readmit was initially vested in the governor and the supreme court;
however, at some point in time the Royal Governor claimed that he had the sole
right to license attorneys. Id. By 1730, the court was sharing the power again by
setting forth qualifications for candidates who sought a license from the governor.
Id. at 172-73. It was also the governor who set up the first commission to hear
complaints about the conduct of attorneys. Id. at 173-74. Similarly, in New Jersey an
act was passed in 1698 that prohibited persons from appearing on behalf of another
in court proceedings unless they had been licensed to practice by the governor. Id. at
197.
53. CHROUST, supra note 33, at 22-23, 65-66, 136, 145-46, 194 (discussing the
history of colonies and the lack of a judiciary that existed separate from the
legislative body until the last decade of the seventeenth century and in some
instances, not until far into the eighteenth century); see also WARREN, supra note 37,
at 3-4.
54. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 112 (Oxford University Press

1989).
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B. Post-Revolution and the Separationof Powers
After the American Revolution, between 1776 and 1780, eleven
of the thirteen states adopted constitutions. 5 5 The other two of the
thirteen original states-Connecticut and Rhode Island-continued to
operate under their Colonial charters for some time after
independence. 56 Six of the new state constitutions-Georgia,
Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and
Virginia-explicitly set out that there would be separate and distinct
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. 7 A

55. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, as reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 1.99-205 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973)
[hereinafter SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS]; GA. CONST. of 1777, as reprinted in 2
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 443-51; MD. CONST. of 1776, as reprintedin 4
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 372-93; MASS. CONST. of 1780, as reprinted
in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 92-110; N.H. CONST. of 1776, as
reprintedin 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 342-43; N.J. CONST. of 1776, as
reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 449-53; N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
as reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 168-80; N.C. CONST. of
1776, as reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 402-11; PA. CONST. of
1776, as reprintedin 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 277-85; S.C. CONST. of
1776, as reprintedin 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 462-67; VA. CONST. of
1776, as reprintedin 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra, at 51-56.
56. In 1776 Connecticut enacted an ordinance that declared the "Form of Civil
Government, contained in the Charter from Charles the second, King of England,"
to be the civil constitution of Connecticut. Constitutional Ordinance of 1776, as
reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 143. In 1818,
Connecticut adopted a constitution that explicitly provided in article II that the
government should be divided into three branches: the legislative, executive, and
judicial. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. II, as reprintedin 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 55, at 145. Similarly, Rhode Island continued to operate "under its
colonial charter for almost seventy years after independence." 8 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 340. It adopted its first constitution in 1842, which
set out the three branches of government. R.I. CONST. of 1842, as reprinted in 8
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 389-92.
57. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. I, as reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 55, at 444; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. VI, as reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 373; MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX, as reprinted
in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 96; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. IV,
as reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 402; PA. CONST. of
1776, Plan or Frame of Government, §§ 1-4, as reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 279; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 5, as
reprintedin 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 49.
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typical provision provided, "That the legislative, executive and
judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other." 58 Five other states-Delaware, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina-adopted
constitutions that did not contain an explicit statement about the
separation of powers. 59 However, during the 1800s all of the state
constitutions that did not clearly delineate three branches of
government were amended to provide for three distinct branches6 1 of
government either explicitly 60 or implicitly through their structure.
58. E.g., MD. CONST. of 1776 art. VI, as reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND
supra note 55, at 373.
59. New Hampshire's Constitution of 1776 was very basic and expressed hope
of reconciliation with Great Britain. N.H. CONST. of 1776, as reprinted in 6
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 342-43. Similarly, neither Delaware
nor New Jersey's Constitutions of 1776 were very comprehensive and they did not
explicitly delineate three distinct branches of government. DEL. CONST. of 1776, as
reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 199; see also editorial
DOCUMENTS,

notes in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 204-05; N.J. CONST. of
1776, as reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 449-53. New

York and South Carolina had more comprehensive first constitutions and, while they
alluded to the three branches of government, they did not explicitly set them out as
separate and distinct. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, as reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 168-80; S.C. CONST. of 1776, as reprinted in 8
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 462-67.

60. New Hampshire articulated a more comprehensive form of government in
its constitution of 1784 and that constitution explicitly provided for the three
branches of government. N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I, § XXXVII, as reprinted in 6
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 347. New Jersey explicitly set out the
three branches of government in its constitution adopted in 1844. N.J. CONST. of
1844, art. III, as reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 455.
South Carolina's Constitution of 1868 contained a provision setting out the three
branches of government. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 26, as reprinted in 8
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 496.

61. New York did not have an explicit separation of powers provision, but that
concept is reflected in the structure of its subsequent constitutions starting in 1821.
See N.Y. CONST. of 1821, as reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note
55, at 181-91. In 1776, Delaware adopted a very basic constitution that did not
explicitly set out the three branches of government. DEL. CONST. of 1776, as
reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 199; see also editorial
notes in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 204. It has never adopted a

specific provision that articulates the three separate branches of government, but the
structure of its constitution has reflected this doctrine since 1792. See DEL. CONST.
of 1792, as reprintedin 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 205-15.
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These early constitutions generally did not contain an explicit
statement as to which branch of government should control the
regulation of the legal profession-two exceptions were Georgia and
New York.6 2 Georgia's Constitution of 1777 provided that the House
of Assembly would determine who was authorized to appear in the
courts:
No person shall be allowed to plead in the courts of law in this
State, except those who are authorized so to do by the house of
assembly; and if any person so authorized shall be found guilty of
malpractice before the house of assembly, they shall have power to
suspend them. This is not intended to exclude any person from that
inherent3 privilege of every freeman, the liberty to plead his own
6
cause.

In contrast, New York's Constitution of 1777 explicitly placed the
power to admit attorneys with the courts: "all attorneys, solicitors, and
counsellors at law hereafter to be appointed, be appointed by the
court, and licensed by the first judge of the court in which they shall
respectively plead or practise, and be regulated by the rules and orders
of the said courts." 64 As states joined the Union in the late 1700s and
62. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVIII, as reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 449; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII, as reprinted
in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 176-77.
63. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVIII, as reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 449. Subsequent constitutions in Georgia did not
contain this provision, but they did explicitly allow for some legislative regulation of
the courts, such as allowing the legislature to limit the courts' powers to punish for
contempt. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 12, as reprintedin 2 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 487.

64. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII, as reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 177. Prior to the Revolution, the power of appointing
attorneys was exercised by the governor of the colony, but that power was
transferred to the courts in the New York Constitution of 1777. People v. Justices of
the Del. Common Pleas, 1 Johns. Cas. 181, 181 (N.Y. 1799). The language in the
1777 constitution was dropped from the constitution of 1846, which then provided:
"Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this state." N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, §
8, as reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 200. Even though
the courts had the power to appoint attorneys, the legislature still acted in this
arena-in 1779 it suspended all law licenses issued before April 21, 1777, subject to
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1800s, the separation of powers doctrine was usually incorporated into
their constitutions, either explicitly or implicitly in the structure of
65
their constitutions.
Without any clear delegation of power to regulate the legal
profession in most state constitutions, both the judicial branches and
the legislative branches played a role in regulating the legal
profession, particularly regarding the admission of attorneys to the
bar. 6 6 Local courts usually had the power to admit persons to appear
before them as an attorney in a representative capacity; however,
legislatures routinely imposed requirements for such admission. For
example, in 1820 the Maine legislature adopted an act that regulated
the admission of attorneys to those who had good moral character,
"devoted seven years at least to the acquisition of scientific and legal
attainments," and took an oath.67 Some legislatures continued to enact
68
laws that related to attorneys' fees and put limits on them.
reinstatement if the attorney proved allegiance to the American cause. WARREN,
supra note 37, at 295, n. 1.
65. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. II, as reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 55, at 33-34.
66. See, e.g., An Act Regulating the Admission of Attorneys to Practise Law
in the Several Courts of this State, ch. 268 (1831), as reprinted in 2 THE GENERAL
PUBLIC STATUTORY LAW AND PUBLIC LOCAL LAW OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND,

FROM THE YEAR 1692 TO 1839 INCLUSIVE 1032-34 (Clement Dorsey ed., Baltimore,
John D. Toy 1840) (requiring that applicants shall have at least two years legal study
and present evidence of his character and if evidence of these requirements are
satisfactorily provided to the court, it shall admit the applicant); An Act to Regulate
the Admission of Attornies at Law, No. 1269 (1785), as reprinted in 4 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 668-69 (Thomas Cooper ed., Columbia,

A.S. Johnston 1838) (proscribing requirements and procedure for admission to the
bar).
67. An Act Regulating the Admission of Attornies, 1820, as reprinted in
LAWS OF THE STATE OF MAINE 319-20 (Hallowell, Goodale, Glazier & Co. 1822);
see also CHROUST, supra note 33, at 28-30 (1965) (discussing some of the statutes
passed after the Revolution); An Act Regulating the Admission of Attornies (1785),
as reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES: THE FIRST
LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 169-70 (John D. Cushing ed.,

Michael Glazier, Inc. 1981) (statute providing that only those of "good moral
character, and well affected to the constitution and government of this
Commonwealth" and upon the taking of an oath shall be admitted as an attorney to
the court). Many oaths required attorneys to plead their allegiance to the American
cause. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 9, 1779, ch. 12, as reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE
ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES: THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 77-78
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The regulation of the legal profession prior to the Revolution
possibly helped to ease some of the public's antipathy towards
attorneys. 69 However, after the Revolution, the distrust of attorneys
appears to have returned, and with it came more anti-lawyer
legislation. 70 In the early to mid-1800s, the public embraced
democratic principles and extended those principles to the legal
profession. 71 A movement emerged seeking to simplify the law by
reducing technical language and making it understandable to the
layperson, thus rejecting the perceived elitism of the British system,
which was steeped in privilege, wealth, and social rank.72 The logical
extension of this movement was that if a layperson could understand
the law, then any person could hold himself out as an attorney. 73 In
response to anti-lawyer legislation, among other reasons, the legal
profession became more organized, particularly with the creation of

(John D. Cushing ed., Michael Glazier, Inc. 1984).
68. See, e.g., 2 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES: THE
FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 584-85 (John D. Cushing ed.,

Michael Glazier, Inc. 1984) (setting attorneys' fees for certain activities).
69. WARREN, supra note 37, at 211.
70. See id. at 212-24, 532. In 1786, the citizens of one Massachusetts town
voted that "We humbly request that there may be such laws compiled as may crush
or at least put a proper check or restraint on that order of Gentlemen denominated
Lawyers." Id. at 215; see also POUND, supra note 43, at 177-85.
71. See, e.g., POUND, supra note 43, at 182-83; WARREN, supra note 37, at
446-47; Roscoe Pound, The Lay Tradition as to the Lawyer, 12 MICH. L. REv. 627,
630-32 (1914).
72. See generally POUND, supra note 43, at 7-8, 13-14 (discussing the
American frontier mode of thought in the last third of the nineteenth century that
sought to de-professionalize the learned callings such as the legal profession);
WARREN, supra note 37, at 532-33; W.G. Hammond, The Legal Profession-Its
Past-Its Present-Its Duty, 9 W. JURIST 1, 8-14 (1875) (discussing how the
increased accessibility of the law-fewer technical terms, fewer Latin terms and
simpler pleadings-made the profession more accessible to the average layman,
whereas before it was only knowable to the privileged and the wealthy). Whether the
law really became accessible to the average person is questionable. See James J.
Robinson, Admission to the Bar as Provided for in the Indiana Constitutional
Convention of 1850-51, 1 IND. L.J. 209, 210 (1926) (discussing the inability of the
common man to understand the law in 1850).
73. See POUND, supra note 43, at 232-37.
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the American Bar Association in 1878, and it began
to take a strong
74
profession.
the
of
integrity
the
improving
interest in

1I.

THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZED BAR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INHERENT POWERS DOCTRINE AND THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY TO
REGULATE THE LEGAL PROFESSION

During the post-Revolution period and until the late 1800s, the
legislative power to enact statutes that regulated the legal profession
was not challenged. However, as the legal profession grew and
became more organized, it began to challenge the scope of the
legislatures' power to regulate the practice of law and, eventually,
challenged the legislatures' power to define the practice of law.75
Nationwide, during the end of the nineteenth century and
especially up through the 1920s, the growth of the legal profession
was rapid. 76 This was attributed to the increase of part-time law
schools which "charged low tuition and accepted virtually all
applicants. 77 The growth of the profession was a particularly
urbanized phenomenon at this time with the majority of full and parttime law schools opening in cities. 78 This urban expansion of
educational opportunities provided a means for immigrants to enter

74. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 495-

98 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the organization of the bar in the late nineteenth
century); POUND, supra note 43, at 13-20, 242-50 (same).
75. See infra Part II for a discussion of challenges to the legislatures' power to
regulate the legal profession and Part III.C for a discussion of challenges to the
legislatures' power to define the practice of law.
76. ABEL, supra note 54, at 75, 277 tbl. 21 (1989). "In the first three decades
of [the twentieth century] admissions rose at an annualized rate of 10.3 percent,
growing nearly fourfold between 1900 and 1928 (see Table 21)." Id. at 75; see also
FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 483.
77. ABEL, supra note 54, at 6; see also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, at 75-76 (1983)

("The success of the part-time schools alarmed the leaders of the profession. They
realized that powerful forces, societal demands, appropriate facilities, and simple
practicality had not only prompted the second proprietary school movement but also
apparently insured its success."). By 1917, Chicago had nine law schools. Id. at 76.
78. STEVENS, supra note 77, at 73-91 (discussing the growth of law schools
and admissions between the late 1800s and early 1900s, as well as the urbanization
of legal education).
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the legal profession, which further grew the profession. 7 9 With the
growth of the profession came further organization in state and
regional bar associations. 80 These organized bars began to take a
strong interest in the regulation and protection of the legal
81
profession.
As previously discussed, state legislatures played a role in the
regulation of attorneys after the Revolution. 82 However, as the legal
profession became organized, it started challenging the power of the
legislative branches to regulate the legal profession. In Illinois, for
example, an early advocate for the legal profession was the Chicago
Bar Association ("CBA"), which had its corporate charter issued on
May 27, 1874.83 The organizers of the CBA had articulated several
objectives for the association, including "the elevation of the character
of the profession ('both as to its learning and morals'); the securing of
proper discipline of 'unworthy members of the bar'; [and] the exercise
of influence in matters of legislation and the administration of
justice., 84 One of its earliest objectives was to curb unlicensed
practitioners and to improve the requirements of those seeking to
become lawyers. 85 An issue of great debate was whether those seeking
admission to the bar should be required to obtain any formal legal

79. The increase of immigrant attorneys did cause some concern among the
bar, and perhaps some xenophobia, which may have been part of the motivation to
increase the requirements for admission to the bar. See, e.g., Louis ANTHES,
LAWYERS AND IMMIGRANTS, 1870-1940: A CULTURAL HISTORY 176-80 (2003)
(discussing the rise of the part-time law school and the increase in the number of
immigrants seeking admission to the bar); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE
102-29 (Oxford University Press 1976) (discussing ethnic and immigrant prejudices
in the legal profession after World War I); George B. Shepherd & William G.
Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19
CARDOzO L. REv. 2091, 2118 (1998) (discussing prejudice against foreign-born
lawyers as a possible rationale for the ABA's attempt to limit the growth of the bar);
Annual Report of the Illinois State Bar Association (1922) 162-65 (discussing bar

passage rates of foreign-born versus U.S.-born applicants to the bar).
80. See, e.g., infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., id.; FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 484.

82. See, e.g., supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
83.

HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION

37 (1974).
84. Id. at 16.

85. Id. at 82-83.

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

training or education, and if so, the number of years of such
86
education.
An early and significant challenge to a state legislature's power to
regulate the practice of law arose in Illinois in the late 1800s. 87 The
CBA, through its member Julian Rosenthal, recommended that the
Illinois Supreme Court adopt uniform standards by establishing a
State Board of Law Examiners; a change from appellate courts each
administering their own examinations.88 Rosenthal proclaimed: "Unfit
and unworthy men have been admitted. The time of the courts has
been uselessly consumed. Progress has been impeded. Litigation has
increased and justice has been delayed., 89 He was also extremely
critical of "fly-by-night" two-year law schools that gave diplomas
regardless of whether students had diligently attended classes and
concluded that these types of law schools were "doubtless one of the
chief causes of the great increase in the number of lawyers, many of
whom [were] entirely unfitted for the exercise of their professional
90
obligations to the client and to the state."

86. Id. at 82-85; see also George Harris Smith, History of the Activity of the
American BarAssociation in Relation to Legal Education and Admission to the Bar,
7 AM. L. SCH. REv. 1 (1930) (summarizing the efforts of the organized bar to
increase educational requirements).
87. See In re Day, 54 N.E. 646 (1899). Discussed in more detail at infra notes
98-114 and accompanying text.
88. KOGAN, supra note 83, at 85-86.
89. Id. at 85. The Illinois State Bar Association ("ISBA") was also interested
in the issue of increasing legal education requirements, as was the American Bar
Association, which formed a section on Legal Education in 1893. See Henry Wade
Rogers, Special Address at the Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of
the Illinois State Bar Association (July 1 and 2, 1897), in PROC. OF THE ILL. ST. BAR
ASS'N., 1897, Part II, at 53 (1897). The ISBA was critical of the Illinois Supreme
Court's lack of effort on this issue prior to the adoption of Rule 39. Id. at 55-56
("The door of admission to the bar must swing on reluctant hinges .... ).
90. KOGAN, supra note 83, at 85. In 1890, law school enrollment nationwide
was 4518 students; in 1900, it was up to 12,516. ABEL, supra note 54, at 277 tbl. 21.
The ease with which men could become attorneys was also threatening the
profession's social status. An address to the graduating class in the Law Department
of Iowa State University in 1875 commented:
[T]he legal profession has undoubtedly lost that character of
exclusiveness, and that arbitrary social rank that once belonged to it ....
Commerce, once regarded as only a better sort of peddling, has now
become a liberal pursuit, in which educated men find all their powers fully
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On November 4, 1897, the Illinois Supreme Court enacted Rule
39, which adopted the CBA's proposal to establish a State Board of
Law Examiners that would hold examinations on a regular basis
throughout the year. 91 The court also agreed to extend the length of
required study (either in school or in a law office) from two years to
three years. 9 2 Students who were enrolled in two-year programs
immediately objected to the injustice of changing their admission
93
requirements in the midst of their programs of study.
After unsuccessfully petitioning the Illinois Supreme Court to
modify Rule 39 so it would exempt those already enrolled in a two94
year program, the students took their cause to the state legislature.
With only one dissenting vote, in 1899 the general assembly passed an
act that required the Supreme Court to admit those students who had
enrolled in a two-year program prior to the adoption of Rule 39.95
Students who could avail themselves of the act's exemption moved
the Supreme Court for admission to the bar. 96 The CBA opposed this
97
motion.
The matter was adjudicated in the case of In re Day.98 In that case,
the Illinois Supreme Court denied the students' motion to be admitted
employed. If successful, it offers prizes to which the average gains of the
lawyer bear no comparison. Thus the bar has lost its privileged position,
and its members stand on the same broad social platform with the rest of
that great army who earn their bread by the labor of their brains, rather
than their hands.
W.G. Hammond, The Legal Profession-Its Past-Its Present-Its Duty, 9 W.
JURIST 1, 4, 7 (1875).
91. See In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 647 (Ill. 1899) (discussing the enactment of
Rule 39 and whether the rule applied to bar applicants who began the study of law
before November 4, 1897); see also KOGAN, supra note 83, at 86. The Supreme
Court named Rosenthal as the Board of Examiner's secretary. Id. Rule 39 now
relates to the appointment of associate judges. See ILL. SUP. CT. RULES 701, 703,
and 704 for the current rules related to qualifications and bar examinations.
92. KOGAN, supra note 83, at 86.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 86-87.
95. Day, 54 N.E. at 646; KOGAN, supra note 83, at 87.
96. KOGAN, supra note 83, at 87.
97. Day, 54 N.E. at 646; see also KOGAN, supra note 83, at 118 (noting that
among those appearing on behalf of the CBA was Lessing Rosenthal, who was the
son of Julius Rosenthal).
98. 54 N.E. 646 (Ill. 1899). Day has been one of the most influential cases
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pursuant to the legislation for two reasons. 99 First, it held that the act
was special legislation that granted privileges to a special class of
persons, which violated the state constitution. l00 Second, and more
significantly, the court held that the legislature's enactment assumed
the exercise of a power that properly belonged to the judicial
branch' 0 1
On the second point, the court spent some time examining English
history and Parliament's legislation regarding admission to the bar.
The court, however, concluded that the English and United States'
systems were not comparable enough to find the analogy useful; the
court considered the separation of powers in this country as being
materially different from the parliamentary system of Britain. 10 2 The
court then examined the limited precedent in this country and found
several cases that supported the proposition that the admission of
attorneys was a purely judicial function over which the legislature had
03
no power.'
There was, however, one prior case from New York where the
court upheld the validity of a statute enacted by the legislature that
required the court to admit graduates from Columbia College to the

regarding the power of the judicial branch. It has been cited by over half of the
states' courts in support of the conclusion that the judicial branch has exclusive
powers over the regulation of the practice of law. There were, however, some earlier
cases that addressed the power of the judicial branch. See, e.g., Ex rel Brackenridge,
1 Serg. & Rawle 187, 1814 WL 1360 (Pa. 1814) (holding that a court's admission of
an attorney is a judicial act, not a ministerial act, and therefore, not a subject for the
writ of mandamus); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 1875 WL 3615, *5 (1875) (stating
that courts have deferred to reasonable legislative acts regarding the admission of
attorneys without considering the question of the legislative branch's power to do
so). But see Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 245 (1864) (holding a legislative act valid,
which required a person to take an oath as a condition precedent to admission to the
bar); In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860) (holding a legislative act valid, which stated
that a diploma from Columbia Law School was conclusive evidence of the ability to
practice law).
99. Day, 54 N.E. at 653.
100. Id. at 648.
101. Id.at653.
102. Id. at 648-50.
103. Id. at 650 (stating that "[i]n this country the courts of the United States
have always controlled the admission of attorneys."). This is not entirely correct. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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bar.1°4 The New York court had reasoned that, while "the appointment
of attorneys [to the bar had] usually been entrusted... to the courts,"
it was not "a necessary or inherent part of their judicial power" and,
therefore, the matter was subject to legislative action.10 5 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and claimed that the New York
decision had "been greatly deplored by eminent men, abundantly able
to judge of the injustice to the public resulting from the6 rule then
10
established, under which other special laws were passed."
The Day court did not, however, completely exclude the
legislature from the regulation of the legal profession. Instead, it made
a distinction between legislative acts that mandated admission to bar
and legislative acts that addressed protecting the public from those
unfit to practice law.' 0 7 The court stated, "[T]he power of the
legislature to protect the public against persons unfit to practice law
and to pass laws for that purpose has never been denied."' 0 8 As an
example, the court affirmed a prior case where it had denied Myra
Bradwell admission to the bar. 10 9 Mrs. Bradwell's application for
admission to the bar was considered by the court, and it found that she
had the requisite learning and ability. 110 However, the court denied her
admission to the bar because the legislature had enacted a statute that
limited admission to men only."
The Day court stated that Mrs. Bradwell was properly denied
admission-the court had exercised its power to assess the issue of
qualifications, but the legislature had the police power to prohibit
admission for other reasons that it believed were in the public's
interest.112 What the court considered essential was that courts had the
104.

Day, 54 N.E. at 651 (citing In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 94-95 (1860)).

105.

In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 90-91 (1860). But see In re Janitor of Supreme

Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (taking a very contrary view, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that its judicial power extended to the selection of the court's janitor).
106. Day, 54 N.E. at 651.
107. Id. at 652.
108. Id.

109. Id. (citing In re Bradwell, 55 11. 535 (1869)). Mrs. Bradwell was later
granted her law license after the legislature passed an amendment stating that no
person should be denied a license on the basis of gender. Id.

110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. (noting that in the Bradwell case, "[t]he legislature did not undertake
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power to "protect themselves against ignorance and want of skill,
[without which] they cannot properly administer justice."' 1 3 In light of
the "diploma mill" that the court saw from law schools, which could
be started by anyone and had no state supervision, the court held that
it properly exercised its powers to enact a rule regarding qualifications
for admission and, under the separation of powers clause in the Illinois
14
Constitution, the legislature could not encroach upon that rule."
The judicial and legislative branches' dispute over the power to
regulate the legal profession was far from over after Day.115 Many
courts continued to find that the legislature had some limited powers
6
to act in the areas of attorney admission, discipline, and disbarment."
by the amendment to deprive the court of passing upon her learning and fitness to
practice law.").
113. Id. The court explicitly stated that the legislature's police powers over the
qualifications of those admitted to other fields, such as doctors, plumbers and
horseshoers, had no influence on the issue before it. Id. at 653.
114. Id. Like many states, Illinois' constitution did not explicitly delegate the
power to regulate the legal profession to the judicial branch. The Illinois
Constitution of 1870 only stated:
The powers of the government of [the State of Illinois] are divided into
three distinct departments, the legislative, executive, and judicial; and no
person, or collection of persons, being one of these departments, shall
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. III, § 1, as reprintedin 3 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 55, at 288.
115. See generally Leon Green, The Courts' Power Over Admission and
Disbarment, 4 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1925) (discussing different theories regarding which
agency of the state government is vested with the power to regulate the legal
profession).
116. See, e.g., In re Miller, 244 P. 376, 380 (Ariz. 1926) ("We are of the
opinion that under its police power the Legislature has the right to say what
qualifications a citizen must possess in order to be permitted to practice law the
same that it may determine the requirements for practicing medicine, dentistry,
pharmacy, or any other profession, vocation or calling."); In re Collins, 81 P. 220,
222 (Cal. 1905) (holding that the legislature has the power to specify the conduct
upon which an attorney may be disbarred and that the court does not have inherent
powers to disbar attorneys for other reasons), overruled by Stratmore v. State Bar of
Cal., 538 P.2d 229, 230 (Cal. 1975); In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 63637 (N.C. 1906) (holding that the legislature, as part of its police powers, has the
power to establish qualifications for professions, including attorneys; the court has
no inherent power to determine who may become an attorney, although it does have
inherent powers over those who have been admitted and have behaved
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Day did, however, become a very influential case in the nation with
respect to the balance of power between the judicial and legislative
branches and the use of the inherent powers doctrine. Many courts
cited Day and adopted its holding that the legislatures can enact some
statutes that speak to the minimum qualifications for admission to the
bar, but that the courts have the exclusive and ultimate authority to
determine who shall be admitted and disbarred. 1 7 As one court
explained:
The manner, terms, and conditions of [attorneys'] admission to
practice, as well as their powers, duties and privileges, are proper
subjects of legislative control to the same extent and subject to the
same limitations as in the case of any other profession or business
that is created or regulated by statute. The only restraints upon the

exercise of this power by the Legislature are that the regulations
prescribed by that branch of the government shall be reasonable
and shall not deprive the judicial branch of its power to prescribe
additionalconditions under which applicants shall be admitted, nor
take from the courts the right and duty of actually making orders
admitting them. In some jurisdictions it has been determined, it is
true, that the power to regulate the machinery governing admissions
to the bar is strictly judicial and that the legislative branch cannot

inappropriately); In re Saddler, 130 P. 906, 909-10 (Okla. 1913) (holding that courts
have a common law power to disbar attorneys, but that the power to admit attorneys
is of statutory origin); see also Green, supra note 115, at 2-18 (surveying the main
approaches that courts had taken regarding which agency of state government has
the power to regulate the legal profession).
117. See, e.g., Hanson v. Grattan, 115 P. 646, 647 (Kan. 1911) (holding the
legislature can prescribe qualifications for the admission and disbarment of
attorneys, to which courts have deferred in order to avoid friction between branches
of government); In re Thatcher, 22 Ohio Dec. 116, 1912 WL 849, at *1, *2-4 (1912)
(holding that the general assembly may provide that an attorney found guilty of
moral turpitude shall not be permitted to practice in any court; however, it may not
say that any particular applicant shall practice as an attorney); Ex rel. Thatcher v.
Brough, 23 Ohio Cir. Dec. 257, 1912 WL 685, at *8 (1912) (holding the legislative
act that reinstated disbarred attorneys unconstitutional); In re Olmsted, 140 A. 634,
636 (Pa. 1928) (holding that statutes dealing with admissions to the bar will be
recognized as valid unless they interfere with the fight of the courts to determine
who shall be entitled to practice before them).
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be concerned with it, but in our opinion such a view is consonant
neither with reason nor with the weight of authority." 18

Day has been cited by over half of the states in support of the
power of the judicial branch to regulate the practice of law and
admission of attorneys.119 Day's main rationale was that courts
possess certain inherent powers that the legislature cannot override
without threatening the judicial branch's ability to function as an
independent branch of government.1 20 Even though the state
constitutions did not usually vest the courts with the express power to
regulate the legal profession, Day and subsequent courts reasoned that
when the state constitutions created the judicial branches, upon their
121
creation "power sprang into being independent of any written law."
These inherent powers were necessary for the court "to protect itself
against any action that would 22
unreasonably curtail its powers or
materially impair its efficiency." 1
While Day held that the judicial branch had the ultimate power to
determine who should be admitted to the bar, many courts used a
similar rationale to claim the additional and related exclusive power 1to
23
determine who should be disciplined and who should be disbarred.
118. In re Chapelle, 234 P. 906, 907-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re Crum, 204 P. 948, 949-50 (Or. 1922)
(holding that determining who is qualified to practice law is a judicial function, but
the legislature may prescribe the qualifications and provide the regulations under
which citizens may engage in the practice of law); State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603,
604-05 (Wis. 1928) (holding that the power to admit and disbar attorneys is not one
that derives from statutes or constitutions, but is inherent in the courts and when
courts follow statutes, they are merely deferring to them).
119. Author's search of Westlaw in 2009. See, e.g., Bump v. Dist. Court of
Polk County, 5 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Iowa 1942); Meunier v. Bemich, 170 So. 567, 576
(La. Ct. App. 1936); Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 982 (Mo. 1937); R.I. Bar
Ass'n v. Auto. Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. 139, 142 (R.I. 1935).
120. In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 652 (Ill. 1899); see also Alpert, supra note 27, at
536-40 (examining Day and the justifications given by the court for its holding).
121. See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 605 (Wis. 1928).
122. Id. at 603; see also In re Cate, 273 P. 617, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928)
(reasoning that inherent powers of the courts derive from the constitution).
123. See, e.g., People ex rel. I11.State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yard State
Bank, 176 N.E. 901, 905 (I11.1931) (holding that the court has the inherent power to
determine the educational and moral qualification for bar admissions, as well as the
inherent power to discipline and disbar attorneys); In re Raisch, 90 A. 12, 21 (N.J.
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The rationale in support of that expansion was generally consistent
with the following decision:
An attorney at law is not merely a member of a profession
practicing for personal gain, nor is he on the other hand a public
officer. He is an officer of the court. The court, by reason of the
necessary and inherent power vested in it to control the conduct of
its own affairs and to maintain its own dignity, has a summary
jurisdiction to deal with the alleged misconduct of an attorney. A
proceeding for disbarment is simply the exercise of jurisdiction
over an officer, an inquiry into his conduct not for the purpose of
granting redress to a client or other person for wrong done, but only
for the maintenance of the
purity and dignity of the court by
24
removing an unfit officer. 1

Eventually, many courts extended the inherent powers doctrine to
the proposition that the judicial branch has the exclusive authority to
define the practice of law. 125 However, this last proposition was not
presented to and accepted by the courts until the 1930s, when the
organized bar made its most significant efforts to curb the
unauthorized practice of law.

1914) (asserting that regardless of statutes, courts have the inherent power to
suspend or expel its own derelict officers).
124. Bar Ass'n of City of Boston v. Casey, 97 N.E. 751, 754 (Mass. 1912)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also People ex rel. Wayman v.
Chamberlin, 89 N.E. 994, 997 (Ill. 1909) (holding that the power of the court to
disbar an attorney is an inherent power that is independent of any statute on the
subject). Some courts had to acknowledge the fact that the legislatures had been
regulating the practice of law. One court justified departing from this past practice as
follows:
Our courts have been slow, perhaps neglectful, in the exercise of their
authority [to regulate admissions to the bar]. Their failure to act may even
have invited the Legislature to take action amounting to an attempt to take
over the performance of this judicial duty, but this fact, if it be one, cannot
affect in the slightest degree the constitutional apportionment of the
separate governmental functions. Nor is the duty of the courts to safeguard
their independence any less clear and imperative because such action if
taken now would be belated and perhaps might result in the criticism of
certain former decisions not altogether well or fully considered.
In re Cate, 273 P. 617, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928) (Craig, J., concurring).
125. See infra Part III.C.
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III. THE SHIFTING STRATEGY OF THE ORGANIZED BAR TO CURB THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE 1920s AND 1930s

In the early 1900s, the legal profession's concerns included not
only establishing higher qualifications for admission to the bar, which
was at issue in Day, but also improving the integrity of the profession
and limiting competition. 126 The legal profession addressed these
concerns by trying to prohibit the unauthorized practice of law by
nonlawyers and by corporations that used lawyers to provide legal
services.127 Although the organized bar had great success in having
the judicial branch assert power over the regulation of attorneys, it did
not initially look to the judicial branch to assist it with curbing the
unauthorized practice of law.' 28 Instead, the organized bar first
lobbied the state legislatures to enact statutes that would define the
practice of law and penalize those engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.' 29 This strategy was not successful so the organized
bar shifted gears in the 1930s and asserted that it was unwise to try to
define the practice of law and, furthermore, unconstitutional for the
130
legislative branch to do so.
A. The Conference of the Delegates and Its Legislative Efforts to
Define the Practiceof Law in the 1920s
During the end of the nineteenth century, the nature of legal
practice was changing and becoming more complex, particularly in
the business world. 31 These changes brought increased competition
126. These concerns were not new in the early 1900s, but there were
heightened efforts to address them. The concerns started as early as the mid-1700s
and have been credited for encouraging the development of bar meetings and bar
associations. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do
Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 159, 165-67 (1980).
127. See id.
128. See infra Part III.A.
129. See infra Part III.A.
130. See infra Part III.B-C.
131. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 483-95 (discussing changes in
the legal profession in the late 1800s and early 1900s); see also Silas H. Strawn, Our
Changing Responsibilities, 13 A.B.A. J.613 (1927) (discussing the impact of the
"labyrinth of laws and regulations that have come into force in the last twenty-five
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not only from nonlawyers, but also from attorneys who worked for
corporations and performed legal work for their customers:
Abstract and title-insurance companies were invading the field of
real estate law, banks and trust companies were handling the
settlement of estates, insurance firms were beginning to indemnify
policyholders against risks that formerly needed the services of
lawyers, and there was an increasing tendency of many litigants to
make out-of-court 1settlements
instead of engaging in prolonged
32
lawsuits.
expensive

While scholars have noted that the legal profession's interest in
preventing nonlawyers and corporations from engaging in activities
they considered the practice of law reached its apex in the 1930s and
40s, the organized bar's concerns about the unauthorized practice of
law began earlier than the 1930s. 133 In 1905, the Chicago Bar
Association formed the Committee on Persons Assuming to Practice
Law without a License. 134 The New York County Lawyers'
Association next established an unauthorized practice of law
committee in 1914.135 That committee focused on the practice of law
years" and their impact on the legal profession).
132. KOGAN, supra note 83, at 88.
133. Several factors have been attributed to this movement-mainly, the
creation of bar associations that centralized the interests of the legal profession,
increased competition from businesses and corporations, and the legal profession's
desire to limit competition, which the Great Depression fueled. Alpert, supra note
27, at 536-38; see also Christensen, supra note 126, at 159, 189-97; FRIEDMAN,
supra note 74, at 483.
134.

ABEL, supra note 54, at 113; DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE

74-75 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
135.

ABEL, supra note 54, at 113; RHODE, supra note 134, at 74-75; Deborah

L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1981)
(citing J.W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 323 (1950)). The efforts of
the New York County Lawyers Association may have been influenced by a
contemporary Yale law review article. Paul H. Sanders, Foreword to Symposium,
The "Unauthorized Practice of Law" Controversy, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2
(1938) (citing George W. Bristol, The Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.
J.590 (1913) as being published around the same time that New York City and other
metropolitan areas began to focus on the unauthorized practice of law); see also
Unlawful Practiceof the Law by Laymen and Corporations-Reportof a Committee
of the New York County Lawyers' Association, in 79 CENT. L. J. 22, 24 (1914).
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by notaries, corporations, collection agencies, and those pretending to
be attorneys. 136 The committee hoped that its report would "invite the
attention of the bar everywhere and the report might well become the
basis for definite action and possibly some new legislation in every
137
state."
The beginning of the American Bar Association's interest in
preventing the unauthorized practice of law is generally dated to 1933,
when it formed a Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law. 138 However, as one scholar noted, the beginning of the ABA's
interest in the issue actually can be dated to 1919, when it was first
taken up at the Conference of Bar Delegates during the annual ABA
meeting:
It is thought by the public generally that this movement of the
organized Bar to repress unauthorized practice of the law is of quite
recent development, dating from the depression in 1929. The truth
of the matter is that the organized movement against unauthorized
practice [of law], excluding local developments in New York
[which started in 1913], was first agitated as many other matters
were, in the Conference of Bar Association Delegates in 1919.139
The Conference of the Delegates of State and Local Bar
Associations ("Conference of Delegates") first met in 1916 at the
136. Unlawful Practiceof the Law by Laymen and Corporations-Reportof a
Committee of the New York County Lawyers' Association, in 79 CENT. L. J. 22, 2223 (1914).
137. Id.at22n.l.
138.

See, e.g., FREDERICK C. HICKS & ELLIOTT R. KATZ, UNAUTHORIZED

PRACTICE OF LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 6 (1934); RHODE,

supra note 134, at 75; Christensen, supra note 126, at 159, 190. During the 1933
meeting of the American Bar Association, the executive committee recommended
creating a new standing committee on the unauthorized practice of law. Clarence E.
Martin et al., Report of the Executive Committee, 58 A.B.A. REPORTS 312 (1933).
The recommendation was accepted that year. Id. at 182; see also Standing

Committees 1933-1934, 58 A.B.A. Reports 33 (1933). Prior to the creation of the
standing committee there had been a special committee on the unauthorized practice
of law, which was created in 1930. See infra text accompanying notes 204-07.
139. M. Louise Rutherford, The Influence of the American Bar Association on
Public Opinion and Legislation 93-94 (August, 1937) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Northern Illinois University,
College of Law Library).
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annual ABA meeting. 40 The attendees were delegates from the ABA,
state bar associations, and local bar associations, who came together to
discuss and make recommendations regarding various topics of
importance to the bar. 141
During the fourth annual meeting of the Conference of Delegates,
which was held in Boston on September 2, 1919, a main topic of
discussion was the relationship between trust companies and the
practice of law. 142 The President of the Conference of Delegates, Elihu
Root, opened the discussion by commenting that, "In the large cities,
corporations, in the nature of trust companies, have taken over in a
large measure a great deal of business which was formerly transacted
by lawyers." 143 He concluded that it seemed desirable to draw some
1 44
line between the two.
The next speaker, William Piatt, asserted the need for a clear line
between the business of a trust company and the practice of law. He
proclaimed that a trust company is organized mainly for the
commercial purpose of generating a profit; however, the practice of
law is an undertaking primarily to render service to the community
and not to generate a profit. 145 Interestingly, Piatt did not argue that
the trust companies were in any way mishandling the tasks that he
thought crossed into the practice of law. His main rationale for
prohibiting their activities was as follows:
[E]very time a trust company or a title company, or a collection
agency, secures a piece of law business, it gets it upon the claim
that it will do it more expeditiously, and with more fidelity towards
discharging the financial obligation to the client for the money it
140.

Conference of Bar Association Delegates, 41 A.B.A. REPORTS 588

(1916).
141.

New York State Bar Association, Proceedingsof the Forty-FourthAnnual

Meeting, 44 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N R. 288 (1921) [hereinafter NYSBA
Proceedings].
142. Elihu Root, President of the Conference of Delegates, Address to the
Conference of Delegates of State and Local Bar Associations (Sept. 2, 1919), in 6
A.B.A. J. 14, 19 (1920).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. William H. H. Piatt, Mo. Member of the Am. Bar Ass'n, Address to the
Conference of Delegates of State and Local Bar Associations (Sept. 2, 1919), in 6
A.B.A. J. 14, 20 (1920).
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may have to handle-thereby
imputing to lawyers lack of business
146
sense and dishonesty.
In other words, his concern was not so much about the quality of the
services that the consumers would receive as it was about the impact
competition would have on attorneys' reputations. Piatt concluded that
"it is time the Bar Associations began to examine the question of
whether the constant attack on lawyers and courts should be permitted
'1 47
to longer continue."
As the discussion among the Conference of Delegates continued,
other attendees recognized the need to deal with the unauthorized
practice of law. 148 What is particularly noteworthy is that the attendees
were focused on curbing the unauthorized practice of law through the
passage of favorable legislation. 4 9 The delegate from Colorado noted
that trust companies had been convicted of violating a statute in New
York. 150 The Colorado Bar Association used the New York bill as a
model for a proposed bill that it presented to its legislature.1 5' It came
within a vote or two of passing, and the Colorado delegate said, "[b]ut
' 152
you should have seen the lobby that the trust companies had."
Mr. Piatt told the Conference that "in 1915, Missouri passed an
act defining the practice of law, and now, when a trust company
undertakes to practice law, we can have the court determine what is
the practice of law."' 153 He claimed that the bad practices of trust
146. Id. at 21. He continued "that all over the country there has been a
constant undermining of confidence in the Bench and Bar by laymen who desire to
practice law for the sake of fees." Id. The resolutions adopted by the Conference of
Delegates at the end of this meeting further reasoned that the relationship of attorney
and client was one that needed to be preserved "and that corporate or lay practice of
law is destructive of that relationship and tends to lower the standard of professional
responsibility." NYSBA Proceedings, supra note 141, at 299.
147. Piatt, supra note 145, at 23.
148. Conference of Delegates of State and Local Bar Associations, 6 A.B.A. J.
14, 25-30 (1920).
149. Id. at 26, 30.
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Piatt, supra note 145, at 30. His argument seems to assume that in the
absence of this statute, the courts may not have had the power to determine a correct
definition of the practice of law.
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companies had virtually disappeared after the passage of this act. Piatt
concluded, "the question which it seems to me confronts the lawyers
determining what is a correct definition of the
is the question ' of
54
law."'
practice of
The delegate from Washington recommended that those present at
the meeting pass a resolution "urging the state legislatures to enact a
law which shall clearly define the relationship existing between the
trust companies and the lawyers." 155 The Conference of Delegates
agreed, and it adopted a resolution providing that a special committee
("Special Committee") of six would "be appointed to prepare for the
use of state and local bar associations a careful brief of what
constitutes practice of the law and what constitutes unlawful and
improper practice of the law by laymen or lay agencies, and that said
committee report at the next Conference." 1 56 No attendees appear to
have questioned whether the state legislatures had the authority to
define the practice of law.
While the Conference of Delegates focused on legislation to help
curb the unauthorized practice of law, it simultaneously lamented the
state bars' inability to influence state legislation on a variety of topics.
The delegates noted that state bar membership was weak,
communication was poor, and discipline of attorneys was not being
adequately addressed.1 57 The organized bar was concerned that it
would not be able to improve the reputation of the legal profession
154. Id.
155. Conference of Delegates of State and Local Bar Associations, 6 A.B.A. J.
14, 26 (1920).
156. Id. at 41.
157. Herbert Harley, 11.Member of the Am.Bar Ass'n, Remarks Before the
Conference of Delegates of State and Local Bar Associations (Sept. 2, 1919), in 6
A.B.A. J. 14, 32-34 (1920). Some of the delegates were also interested in having the
Bar recognized as an independent political body because they were concerned that
they did not have an adequate voice in the political process. Clarence N. Goodwin,
Ill. Member of the Am. Bar Ass'n, Remarks Before the Conference of Delegates of
State and Local Bar Associations (Sept. 2, 1919), in 6 A.B.A. J. 14, 38 (1920). The
importance of this issue was also discussed during the 1921 meeting of the New
York State Bar Association. It was noted that the bar was not influencing "public
opinion equal to the forces of other agencies that were influencing public opinion,
and that it was highly important that the Bar of each State should be organized and
should be an official part of the organization of the judicial system of the states."
NYSBA Proceedings, supra note 141, at 291.
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and its impact on legislation unless it had a strong organized voice in
the states, such as becoming an integrated bar.158 However, the state
bar organizations were having little success in influencing the
legislatures on this issue.' 59 Herbert Harley from Illinois complained:
Important subjects are coming up every year and yet we know that
the demands of the bar associations are not receiving as much
consideration from the state legislatures as they are entitled to,
notwithstanding the fact that in every legislature there are more
lawyers than any other class of people, and that the judiciary
committees where these measures usually fail, are composed of
lawyers. 160

The Conference of Delegates next met on August 24, 1920, and
the Special Committee reported it had written a brief with a proposed
definition of the practice of law. 161 The Special Committee had
endeavored to formulate a definition that would be "all inclusive and
all exclusive to the end that there may not be under the definition a
little unlawful practice of the law." 162 The Special Committee noted
158. The Committee on State Bar Organization's report, which was presented
during the 1921 Conference of Bar Association Delegates, concluded the following:
First, that it was in the public's interest to protect the public from unqualified lay
practitioners, as well as from unscrupulous lawyers; second, that the public will not
sympathize with the Bar until membership in it is a badge of honor with a guaranty
of honesty among its members; and lastly, that the path to improving the reputation
of the bar is "legislative action in the several states, recognizing the Bar of the state
as a body politic and giving it power to govern itself, both in the matter of admission
and discipline." Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of Bar Association
Delegates, 46 A.B.A. REPORTS 572 (1921).
159. Harley, supra note 157, at 32. The organized bar had noted that the
majority of those in the legislatures were lawyers. Merrel Price Calloway, Vice
President of the NY Guar. Trust Co., Remarks Before the Conference of Delegates
of State and Local Bar Associations (Sept. 2, 1919), in 6 A.B.A. J.14, 29 (1920).
However, only about 20-25% of lawyers were involved in bar associations. Harley,
supra note 157, at 32. Therefore, as a group, they may not have had much influence
before the legislatures despite the fact that lawyers heavily populated the
legislatures.
160. Harley, supra note 157, at 32.
161. Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of American Bar
Association, 45 A.B.A. REPORTS 55 (1920). A full copy of the brief can be found
reprinted in 44 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N R. app. A at 299-367 (1921).
162. NYSBA Proceedings, supra note 141, at 300.
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that court decisions defining the practice of law were limited because
they "necessarily define[d] practice of the law as to the issues
presented by the particular case, and ... the several states by statute
have in but few instances attempted a definition either by including
63
things allowed or prohibited things not allowed." 1
The brief reasoned that a definition was necessary for the
protection and the benefit of society, not for the benefit of the
practitioner. 164 The Special Committee's rationale for a definition
continued to focus on maintaining the status of law as a profession and
preventing its demise into a business:
Practice of the law is not a business in the general acceptation of
that term, never was, and never can be. The sole inducement to the
layman to practice law and do law business is the fee derived
therefrom .... The layman, a natural person or corporate, may only
compete with the lawyer in the practice of the law and the doing of
law business by orally soliciting or advertising to do it more
expeditiously, faithfully, intelligently, and at less expense than the
lawyer, thereby imputing to the lawyer slothfulness, infidelity, and
extortion. A loss of confidence in the courts and lawyers is a sign of
governmental
decline, and a forerunner of disintegration and
65
anarchy. 1

163. Id.
164. Id. at 302. The brief does not contain any argument that the integrity of
the judicial branch requires curbing the unauthorized practice of law, which
becomes the lead rationale adopted by the courts in the 1930s and 40s. See infra Part
III.C.
165.
NYSBA Proceedings, supra note 141, at 302-03. The brief further
focused on the lawyer's role as a servant to the State. The brief reasoned:
In normal times, when the world seemed somehow better ordered and
smoother running than now, the Lawyer, unless he ascended the bench or
entered some branch of the government or public life, was not often called
upon for an active discharge of his broader duty to the State. But today the
Lawyer's public duty predominates ....
Forces of evil break out on all
sides. The press is a daily chronicle of strikes, profiteering, soapbox
chicanery and blatant crime. There is trouble now and there is trouble
ahead.
Id. at 304.
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The Special Committee's proposed definition was expansive,
although it focused on performing certain acts only when done as a
vocation:
Present day practice of the law, in its broadest sense, therefore
embraces and comprehends the vocation of personally appearing as
an advocate in a representative capacity, or the drawing of any
papers, pleadings, documents, or the performance of any act in such
capacity in connection with proceedings pending or prospective
before any court, commissioner, referee, master, or any body,
board, committee, commission or officer constituted by law, or
having authority to settle controversies, or the advising, or
counseling as a vocation any person, firm, association or
corporation as to any secular law, or the drawing or the procuring
of assistance in the drawing, as a vocation, of any papers,
documents, or instruments affecting or relating to secular rights, or
the doing, as a vocation, of any act in a representative capacity on
behalf of another, obtaining or tending to obtain, or securing or
tending to secure for such other any property or property rights
whatever. The doing in a representative capacity, as a vocation, of
any of the foregoing by a person not licensed as an attorney, or by a
corporation constitutes unlawful and improper practice by such
person or corporation. 166
The definition's focus on providing services as a vocation was
consistent with a couple of state statutes that had been enacted, which
only prohibited certain activities when they were done for a fee or
other consideration.1 67 This prohibition was consistent with the bar's

166. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). A variety of authorities were cited in support
of this definition. Id. at 305-10. The brief notes that few states had, by statute,
attempted to define the practice of law. Instead, they had left the enumeration of
prohibited practices to the interpretation of the courts on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
301-02. The brief commented on the juxtaposition between this legislative absence
and the legislatures' common requirements regarding admission to the bar such as
requirements that applicants have good moral character and that they take an oath.
Id. at 302. The brief does not question whether the legislature has the power to
define the practice of law. Id. at 297-367. Indeed, it did discuss statutory definitions
and prohibitions existing in Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New York, and
Oregon. Id. at 346-58.
167. Id. at 346-48, 357.
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focus on preventing the commercialization of the profession.1 68 The
Special Committee's brief stated that:
[W]herever and whenever a layman or lay agency charges a fee, as

an attorney's fee, for services rendered by it of a kind, character,
and in a manner that an attorney may render and charge an
attorney's fee for rendering, such layman or lay agency
in such
169
instance is unlawfully and improperly practicing law.
During the 1920 meeting, the delegates resolved "[t]hat the
definition of the practice of law contained in the report of the Special
Committee (Mr. Piatt's committee) be recommended to the various
state and local bar associations for adoption in their state laws by
appropriate legislation."170 A copy of the brief containing the
171
definition was sent to all state and local bar associations.
The Conference of Delegates' initiative to have state legislatures
enact a definition of the practice of law gained little traction. 172 The
subsequent conference reports give little indication as to whether the
bars' efforts were unsuccessful in the state legislatures or whether, for
other reasons not disclosed in the conference reports, the state and
local bars lost their motivation to pursue the issue. During the 1921
meeting of the Conference of Delegates, the following was reported:
It was made clearly manifest that the Bar is showing greater activity
in the fields of professional effort than ever before. It was evident
also that the resolutions submitted at previous meetings of the
Council have had marked effect in many localities, especially in the
168.

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

169. NYSBA Proceedings, supra note 141, at 360. The brief also discussed
Missouri's statute that defined the practice of law and noted that "no layman is
penalized for practicing law and doing law business without charge." Id. at 346. If
no attorney was available to draft a will, a contract, or other agreement, or if a
person does not want to pay an attorney to draft such documents, "in such instance
he may have the services of a layman." Id. at 346-47.
170. Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of Bar Association
Delegates, 45 A.B.A. REPORTS 396 (1920) (emphasis added); see also Rutherford,

supra note 139, at 94.
171.
Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of Bar Association
Delegates,45 A.B.A. REPORTS 396 (1920).

172. By the end of the 1920s, very few states had enacted definitions of the
practice of law. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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matter of curbing unlawful practice of the law, and the
encouragement of legal aid work. 73
However, no specific efforts were discussed and no mention was
made of any state that had passed or even considered legislation
adopting the proposed definition of the practice of law, or any other
definition of the practice of law. 174 During the next meeting in 1922, it
was reported that California had passed an act to prevent the unlawful
practice of law, but it would not take place until approved on
referendum. The meeting report notes that, "The banks and trust
companies of the state are making an open campaign against the
175
measure."
By the 1923 annual meeting of the Conference of Delegates, the
topic of the unauthorized practice of law, and the specific subject of
legislation defining the practice of law, were not mentioned at all in
the annual report. 176 However, Chief Justice Taft gave a speech during
that meeting that was critical of legislatures and said that they "do not
give sufficient attention to the general subject of legal reform and
procedures." 177 Whether Chief Justice Taft was commenting on the
failure to have statutes passed defining the practice of law, or other
legal reform measure the bar was proposing such as integrated bars, is
pure speculation.
By 1927, only a few states had passed legislation that defined the
practice of law. 178 At least one of these states had passed legislation
defining the practice of law prior to the efforts of the Conference of
Bar Delegates. 179 Overall, the organized bar's lobbying efforts appear
to have produced anemic results.
173. Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of Bar Association
Delegates, 46 A.B.A. REPORTS 572 (1921).

174. Id. at 572-73.
175.

Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of Bar Association

Delegates, 47 A.B.A.

REPORTS

597 (1922).

176. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference of Bar Association
Delegates,48 A.B.A. REPORTS 548-64 (1923).

177. William Howard Taft, U.S. Chief Justice, Remarks at the Eighth Annual
Conference of Bar Association Delegates (Aug. 28, 1923), in 48 A.B.A. REPORTS
548,549 (1923).
178. See, e.g., MT. REV. CODES § 8944 (1921), reprinted in HICKS & KATZ,
supra note 138, at 39; see also infra note 179.

179. Missouri had already enacted a definition of the practice of law prior to
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B. The OrganizedBar's Renewed Efforts to Curb the Unauthorized
Practiceof Law in the 1930s and Its Shift Away from Defining the
Practiceof Law
After the Conference of Delegates' strong interest in 1919-1920 to
curb the unauthorized practice of law and have legislation passed
180
defining the practice of law, by 1923 the issue became dormant.
The bar's focus on the unauthorized practice of law did not experience
a major revival until after the beginning of the Great Depression,
when it became a prominent topic at the ABA's annual meeting in
1930.181 Some scholars have theorized that the Great Depression was
the driving force behind several protectionist measures that the legal
profession promulgated, including eliminating for-profit law
schools, 182 increasing educational requirements for admission to the
bar, giving more severe bar examinations, and imposing more
183
stringent character requirements.

the efforts of the Conference of Delegates. See supra text accompanying note 153.
By 1934, several other states had enacted statutes that defined the practice of law.
See infra note 235.
180. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
181. Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of American Bar
Association, 55 A.B.A. REPORTS 94 (1930); see also Rutherford, supra note 139, at
94. The efforts of the Conference of Delegates were mentioned in the 1925 annual
report, but not in the context of any specific reform efforts such as having the
practice of law defined. In 1925, the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances mentioned the 1920 report adopted by the Conference of Delegates in
the context of giving an ethics opinion about whether a lawyer may accept
employment from a lay intermediary who will profit from the lawyer's services.
ABA Comm. On Prof'1 Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 8, in 50 A.B.A. REPORTS
518, 520-21 (1925).
182. See, e.g., Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 79, at 2114-25 (citing a 1937
article by the Dean of Columbia Law School that sought the elimination of all forprofit law schools).
183. See, e.g., id.; AUERBACH, supra note 79, at 108-29; see also James
Grafton Rogers, U.S. Assistant Sec'y of State, Overcrowding of the Bar, Address at
the Fifty-Fifth Annual Meeting of American Bar Association Proceedings of the
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, in 57 A.B.A. REPORTS 68183 (1932); Young B. Smith, The Overcrowding of the Bar and What Can Be Done
About It, 7 AM. L. SCH. REv. 565 (1932).
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In the 1930s, much of the organized bar concluded that the legal
profession was overcrowded. 184 The number of attorneys nationwide
increased from 122,500 in 1920 to 160,600 in 1930.185 This was a
thirty-one percent increase in the number of lawyers, whereas the
general population increased by only sixteen percent during the same
period of time. 186 Some members of the profession recognized that
more attorneys meant greater public access to attorneys and better
price competition for the public.' 87 Other people in the legal
profession argued that the bar was not overcrowded, at least when
measured against community need. 188 There was, however, much
sentiment among the profession that the growing number of attorneys
"will be altogether evil." 189
Regardless of whether or not the profession was overcrowded,
there was no doubt that the income of attorneys had declined
significantly after the Depression, although not in an amount that was

184. See Proceedingsof the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, 57 A.B.A. REPORTS 649-52 (1932); Rogers, supra note 183, at 679; and Wiley
B. Rutledge, A Survey of the Welfare of the Missouri Bar, 8 AM. L. SCH. REv. 128,
130 (1934) for a discussion of the overcrowding of the bar at that time.
185. Rogers, supra note 183, at 679. However, during World War II, law
school enrollments dropped dramatically. See ABEL, supra note 54, at 74; Smith,
supra note 183, at 668-71 (1932).
186. Rogers, supra note 183, at 680-81.
187. Id.
188. Lloyd G. Garrison, Results of the Wisconsin Bar Survey, 8 AM. L. SCH.
REv. 116, 121 (1934) (arguing that empirical research showed that the volume of
legal business had increased in Wisconsin at a greater rate than the number of
attorneys); Smith, supra note 183, at 668-76 (arguing that the increase in attorneys
from 1920 to 1930 may not signify an overcrowding of the bar because there may
have been an insufficient number of attorneys in 1920). But see Isidor Lazarus, The
Economic Crisis in the Legal Profession, I NAT'L LAW. GUILD Q. 17, 21 (19371938) ("The 'depression' never will be entirely overcome. In the absence of
fundamental adjustments, fewer lawyers are needed per capita of population than
formerly because business has become concentrated and fewer individuals need
lawyers for ordinary business purposes.").
189. Rogers, supra note 183, at 680-81; see also Lazarus, supra note 188, at
23 (arguing that overcrowding of the profession hurts the public because it is then
"subjected to demoralized professional standards and the menace of unethical
conduct on the part of those economically depressed, unable to turn to other
employment, yet understandably unwilling to starve.").
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disproportionate to other professions.1 90 It was estimated that the drop
in lawyers' income from 1929 to 1932 was 39.9%; but engineers
dropped 38.4%, and doctors and surgeons dropped 38.8% during the
same time period. 19 1 The decline in income generated some discussion
among the legal profession about setting minimum fee schedules to
protect incomes,1 92 as well as establishing quotas for the number of
93
attorneys admitted to practice.'
During the 1930s, the organized bar returned again to the issue of
educational requirements for admission to the bar as one way to
address the perceived overcrowding of the bar. The ABA and the
American Association of Law Schools ("AALS") joined forces to
convince state legislatures and courts to deny law licenses to those
who received their training through apprenticeships or from for-profit
194
law schools, which largely consisted of part-time law schools.
Again, the bar's efforts to lobby the state legislatures were not
immediately fruitful. 19 5 One article has theorized that the lack of
success was due to the fact that state legislatures were "filled with the
graduates of the night law schools that the ABA and AALS hoped to
19 6
eliminate."'

190. See Garrison, supra note 188, at 123-24.
191. Id. at 124; see also Rutledge, supra note 184, at 130-32 (analyzing
decline of incomes of lawyers in Missouri from 1929 to 1933).
192. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 79, at 2225. But see Rutledge, supra
note 184, at 133-34 (opposing minimum fee schedules).
193. See Lazarus, supra note 188, at 23 (recommending serious study be given
to a quota system to deal with the overcrowding of the bar); Shepherd & Shepherd,
supra note 79, at 2124 (discussing quotas imposed on the number of new attorneys
in Pennsylvania in 1935).
194. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 79, at 2116-17. The efforts to limit
admission to the bar may have been nationalist as well as protectionist. The student
population of the part-time law schools was largely foreign born. Id. at 2118. Yale
Law School was worried about the "Jewish Problem," and wanted to reserve slots
for those of "old American" ancestry. Id. at 2119. Similarly, a bar leader opined that
"Jewish applicants for the bar were 'without the incalculable advantage of having
been brought up in the American family life,' and therefore they 'can hardly be
taught the ethics of the profession as adequately as we desire."' Id. (citation
omitted).
195. Id. at 2120.
196. Id.
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For example, during the 1920s, an average of twenty-five graduates
of Suffolk Law School served in the Massachusetts legislature. The
legislators still remembered Abraham Lincoln, who had not
attended law school. They believed that law schools should remain
open to the "poor and worthy."... The deans of the new law
schools understood that the elite law schools, most of which were
associated with colleges, were attempting to eliminate the new
schools by convincing state legislaturesnot to license students from
the new schools. For example, at the 1929 ABA meetings, the dean
of Suffolk Law school, in an address entitled "Facts and
Implications of College Monopoly of Legal Education," noted that
the ABA and AALS had hired a lobbyist "at a $10,000 a year salary
as field agent to capture the various states of the Union for the
college monopoly. 197
To some extent, a class war may have been waging among
198
attorneys with different types of practices, training and education.
This class distinction can be seen as early as 1875 in a speech given to
a graduating law class, in which the speaker characterized the
profession as containing a "nominal bar" and a "true bar":
[O]thers fancy that [admission to the bar] adds respectability to
some of the less recognized, but more immediately lucrative
occupations,- real estate, brokerage, tax-paying, insurance agency,
etc., etc. All these classes together have made the nominal bar a
great, ill sorted, disjointed body of self-appointed members, having
little or nothing in common with the true bar, composed of men
who study the law for its own sake and practice it as the work of
199
their lives.

197. Id. at 2120-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
198. See AUERBACH, supra note 79, at 40-73; FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at
497-98; Quintin Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle
Among Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1955); Shepherd & Shepherd,

supra note 79, at 2116 (1998) (arguing that in the 1920s the ABA represented an
elite class of attorneys, which only represented about 9% of the legal profession).
199. Hammond, supra note 90, at 15. Another commentator later complained
that men not fit to become lawyers were debasing the profession by entering the
profession and then being "despised as the hangers on of police courts and the
nibblers of crumbs which a dog ought to be ashamed to touch. It would be a blessing
if some Noachian deluge would engulf half of those who have license to practice."
Rogers, supra note 89, at 53. This class war may also be reflected in the organized
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Despite the initial resistance, the bar's movement to restrict
admission to the bar to those who had attended accredited law schools
eventually gained strength.2 °° In 1927, no state required graduation
from a law school as a requirement for admission; by 1941, forty-one
states required graduation from an ABA accredited law school as a
prerequisite to bar admission.20 '
The economic times of the 1930s also caused a renewed
discussion among the organized bar about services that nonlawyers
and corporations were providing to the public. 20 2 As one writer
complained, "[T]here are many positions now filled by laymen which
should more appropriately be filled by lawyers, and ...the profession
should continue to fight for such change." 20 3 During the ABA's 1930
meeting, the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances ("Ethics Committee") reported that it was concerned about
corporations hiring attorneys to provide legal services to the
corporations' patrons, members, or subscribers. 20 4 Collection
agencies, which were seen to control almost all collection and
bankruptcy work, were also a concern. 20 5 The ABA's annual report
stated:

bar's inability to get legislation passed that favored its interests despite the fact that
the legislatures were heavily comprised of lawyers. See supra notes 195-98 and
accompanying text.
200. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 79, at 2121-22. George and William
Shepherd theorize that while the ABA's members only consisted of a minority of
practicing lawyers, there was no rival group of organized lawyers; therefore, the
ABA could purport to speak for the profession. Id.
201. Id. at 2122. The accredited law schools, however, struggled with
enrollment numbers as young men were called into military service during World
War II. In 1943, the New York Times reported: "Ingatius M. Wilkinson, dean of
Fordham Law School, declared the enrollment of women in the law at Fordham had
nearly doubled and that if the war went on only women and physically handicapped
young men would be in training for the legal profession." State Bar Fearful of
"Bootleg" Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1943, at 30.
202. Wiley B. Rutledge, A Survey of the Welfare of the Missouri Bar, 8 AM. L.
SCH. REv. 128, 132 (1935); Charles E. Clark, The ProposedNational Survey of the
Bar, 8 AM. L. SCH. REv. 138, 146 (1935).
203. Lazarus, supra note 188, at 24.
204. Thomas Francis Howe et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances,55 A.B.A. REPORTS 480-85 (1930).
205. Id. at 482.
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There have been, and in some places still are, differences of opinion
as to what constitutes the practice of law. Despite the many
decisions to the contrary, some lawyers will contend that lay
organizations are not practicing law so long as they employ
licensed attorneys to handle the legal matters entrusted to them by
their patrons .... As this report is being prepared, these contentions
are being raised in cases
pending in the Supreme Courts of both
20 6
Illinois and Minnesota.
The Ethics Committee suggested that a special committee be

formed to investigate the unauthorized practice of law ("Special
Committee on UPL") and to consider actions that could be taken to
protect the public from such activities.20 7 The focus at this point was
legal services provided by lawyers through entities such as
corporations, banks, trust companies, and collection agencies. 20 8 In
other words, the Ethics Committee was focused on situations that
could not "exist without the participation and cooperation of
20 9
lawyers."
The report of the Ethics Committee contained no mention of the
Conference of Delegates' earlier efforts to curb the unauthorized
practice of law, or its desire to have a definition of the practice of law
adopted by the state legislatures. In fact, contrary to the position taken
by the Conference of Delegates a decade earlier, the 1931 joint report
of the Ethics Committee and Special Committee on UPL praised
recent court decisions for refraining from adopting a definition of the
practice of law:
206. Id. at 481.
207. Id. at 476.

208. The Ethics Committee's report does note that most states have statutes of
some kind that prohibit the practice of law by corporations, but that there had been
little prosecution under them. In fact, lawyers resisted any enforcement of these
statutes because many of them were performing this legal work on behalf of banks
and trust companies. Similarly, lawyers employed by collection agencies were
thought of as now being dominated by the opinions of that industry. Id. at 481-82;
see also Frederick Hicks & Elliott R. Katz, The Practiceof Law by Laymen and Lay

Agencies, 41 YALE L.J. 69, 70 (1931) (discussing lay agencies such as trust, title and
insurance companies, banks, tax experts, accountants, collection agencies, notaries,
and real estate brokers that were "performing functions heretofore commonly
regarded as within the exclusive province of the lawyer.").
209. Thomas Francis Howe et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
ProfessionalEthics and Grievances, 55 A.B.A. REPORTS 483 (1930).
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In these decisions the courts have wisely refrainedfrom any precise
definition of what constitutes the practice of law .... However,

these decisions refer to a definition made by a committee of this
Association, which is of such a general nature as to be worthy of

repetition here: "The practice of law is any service, involving legal
knowledge, whether of representation, counsel, or advocacy, in or
out of court, rendered in respect of the rights, duties, obligations,
2 10
liabilities or business relations of the one requesting the service."

Like the Conference of Delegates, the Ethics Committee and
Special Committee on UPL did not argue that nonlawyers were
incompetently performing any services. Instead, they complained that
the use of attorneys by lay intermediaries "undermine[d] the
profession's capacity for disinterested service and [destroyed] thereby
2 11
its usefulness to the public."
The Special Committee on UPL started its investigation of the
practice of law by corporations and lay individuals by sending to all
bar associations a questionnaire regarding the nature and extent of the
unauthorized practice of law within their jurisdiction. 2 12 During the
1931 annual meeting, the Special Committee on UPL concluded that
the responses "established beyond question that unauthorized
practices were general and were increasing throughout the country
210. Thomas Francis Howe et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, 56 A.B.A. REPORTS 431-32 (1931) (emphasis
added). The report does not identify the source of the quote regarding a prior
definition of the practice of law drafted by a committee of the association. It is
possible that this is referencing Piatt's brief, although the specific quoted language is
not present in the definition presented in the brief. See NYSBA Proceedings, supra
note 141 app. A, at 287-367 (1921).
211. Thomas Francis Howe et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
ProfessionalEthics and Grievances, 56 A.B.A. REPORTS 432 (1931). This idea was
restated the following year: "Every lawyer's license is granted to him by the state
primarily for the protection of the public. The earning of a livelihood by the lawyer
is merely incidental in so far as the state's purpose in granting the license is
concerned." John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of the Law,57 A.B.A. REPORTS 564 (1932); see also John G.
Jackson, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 12 NEB. L. BULL. 332, 335-38 (193334) (arguing that the legal profession cannot compete with nonlawyers because it
will commercialize the profession and focus the profession on pecuniary gain
instead of public service).
212. John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law,56 A.B.A. REPORTS 471 (1931).
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except in the rural districts. 2 13 Specifically, the committee concluded
that: banks and trust companies were preparing legal documents for
others; collection agencies were instituting actions on behalf of
creditors and preparing the associated legal documents (sometimes by
hiring a lawyer); trade associations and clubs were hiring attorneys to
provide legal services to their members; title companies were
furnishing opinions on titles; lay persons were preparing corporate
charters, bylaws, and stock certificates; and notary publics and justices
of the peace were preparing wills, bills of sales, deeds, and other
documents affecting property rights.214 The ABA's main area of
concern continued to be corporate entities hiring attorneys to provide
legal services and then exerting control over their professional
judgment.2 15
The Special Committee on UPL also reported that the
questionnaires revealed a paucity of penal statutes prohibiting the
practice of law by corporations and lay individuals. 216 The committee
213. Id.
214. Id. at471-72.
215. John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, 57 A.B.A. REPORTS 569 (1932). The 1932 report of the Special
Committee on UPL stated:
Instances have come to our attention where the attorney has been
specifically directed [by collection agencies] to pursue harassing and
coercive tactics not justified by the facts. .

.

. All such evils are the

outgrowth of the commercialized intervention of one or more lay
intermediaries between an attorney and his client ....

When lay agencies

undertake to do this they are clearly practicing law unlawfully.
Id. at 569-70. In its 1935 report, the committee stated that the unauthorized practice
of law could not exist unless lawyers were participating because it had "discovered
that the public will not accept legal advice and will not accept the practice of law by
laymen." Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of American Bar
Association, 60 A.B.A. REPORTS 144 (1935). This, however, seems inconsistent with
the committee's report in 1934, which contained results of a nationwide
questionnaire regarding the unauthorized practice of law, and showed that
individuals who were not members of the bar, such as Justices of the Peace, notaries
public, bankers, real estate agents, insurance agents, and others, were providing legal
advice for payment of a fee. Arthur E. Sutherland et al., Report of the Standing
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 59 A.B.A. REPORTS 523-33
(1934).
216. John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized
Practiceof the Law, 56 A.B.A. REPORTS 473 (1931); see also Arthur E. Sutherland
et al., Report of the Standing Committee on ProfessionalEthics and Grievances, 59
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further noted, without details, that a number of states had proposed
legislation that was "unfair and retaliatory," presumably toward the
legal profession. 2 17 While the Special Committee on UPL favored
statutes that penalized the corporate and unauthorized practice of law,
it proclaimed it was "of the opinion that no such statute should
undertake to define what constitutes 'the practice of law,' believing
that this should be left to the courts for development through
decisions." 2 18 The committee did not provide any explanation for this
opinion, nor did it acknowledge that it was a departure from the
Conference of Delegates' opinion a decade earlier. In the 1932 Report
of the Special Committee on UPL, the committee continued to
reiterate its position "that legislation which attempts to define or limit
A.B.A. REPORTS 531-36 (1934) (detailing results of a subsequent similar
questionnaire).
217. John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, 56 A.B.A. REPORTS 473 (1931).
218. Id. In 1931, the committee expressed the following rationale for curbing
the increase in the unauthorized practice of law:
The practice of law by unauthorized persons is an evil because it
endangers the personal and property rights of the public and interferes
with the proper administration of justice. It is not an evil because it takes
business away from lawyers. If law work could be as well accomplished
by laymen, the requirements of honesty, learning and good character
would not have been established and insisted on as conditions precedent to
the right to enter the profession.
Id. at 477. The idea of having statutes penalize the unauthorized practice of law, but
refrain from defining the unauthorized practice of law, is one that has gained
significant traction over time. Today, every state penalizes the unauthorized practice
of law by statute, but hardly any states provide a definition of the unauthorized
practice of law. See ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, 1994 SURVEY AND
RELATED MATERIALS ON THE UNAUTHORIZED

PRACTICE OF LAW/NONLAWYER

PRACTICE 55-248 (1996) (state-by-state summary of unauthorized practice of law
statutes and rules). Several challenges have been raised to the constitutionality of
statutes that punish conduct that they have not defined, but none of these challenges
have been successful. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 674 So. 2d 747, 750-51 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996); State v. Wees, 58 P.3d 103, 107-08 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); Iowa
Supreme Court Comm'n on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. Sturgeon, 635 N.W.2d
679, 685 (Iowa 2001); Mont. Supreme Court Comm'n on Unauthorized Practice of
Law v. O'Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 215 (Mont. 2006); State v. Rogers, 705 A.2d 397, 401
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); State v. Hunt, 880 P.2d 96, 99-100 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994); see also LAS Collection Mgmt. v. Pagan, 858 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass.
2006) ("Statutes may provide penalties for the unlicensed practice of law, but may
not extend the privilege.").
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the practice of the law or to establish a basis of relationship between
lawyers and lay organizations is ill-advised and provocative of
trouble."

'2 19

The Special Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
became an ABA standing committee in 1933 ("Standing Committee
on UPL"). 220 The Standing Committee on UPL continued to take the
position that it was unwise to try to define the practice of law:
The committee is convinced that statutes imposing a penalty on
corporations and unlicensed individuals undertaking to practice law
are desirable and should be enacted in states where no such
legislation exists. It is highly important first, that such statutes
should not be emasculated by exceptions in favor of any class or
business, and second, that they should not undertake to define the
practice of the law. We believe no such definition is either
practicable or advisable. A study of definitions heretofore
attempted makes it obvious that in the last analysis of whether or
not a particular course of conduct does or does not constitute
practice of the law must be left to the courts. A legislative22definition
1
is highly undesirableas self-limiting and inviting evasion.

219. John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, 57 A.B.A. REPORTS 563 (1932); see also State Bar Favors Jury
Trial System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1932, at 5 (quoting the former president of the
ABA as saying "My own view is that it is very fortunate that there is not a statutory
definition of the [practice of] law. Every statutory definition is easily evaded."). At
that time, the ABA had not taken the position that the judicial branch was the only
branch of government with the power to define the practice of law. Instead, it merely
asserted that the question of what constituted the practice of law could be decided
only by the state, through its proper tribunal, and not by the bar association or
corporations. Jackson et al., supra, at 563. The report did not elaborate on whether
the proper tribunal was the court, the legislature, or either. Id.
220. Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of American Bar
Association, 58 A.B.A. REPORTS 182 (1933). The Standing Committee on UPL sent
out an additional questionnaire to bar associations around the country to try to assess
the magnitude of the unauthorized practice of law. The questionnaire is reprinted in
20 A.B.A. J. 152-54 (1934).
221. Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of American Bar
Association, 58 A.B.A. REPORTS 482-83 (1933) (emphasis added). Some members
of the ABA went further and stated that not only was it undesirable to define the
practice of law, it was impossible to do so. See, e.g., Ralph T. Catterall, The
UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 19 A.B.A. J. 652, 652 (1933) ("It is impossible to
define the practice of law."); William Boyd Henderson, Unauthorized Practice of
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That same year, the ABA adopted a National Bar Program and
Coordination Plan that sought "to focus the attention of lawyers
throughout the country on .. .four subjects," one of which was the
unauthorized practice of law. 222 In furtherance of that program, The
Unauthorized Practice News started its monthly publication in 1934
as a way of disseminating information about the efforts around the
223
country to quell the unauthorized practice of law.
The Standing Committee on UPL published a handbook on the
unauthorized practice of law in 1934.224 In the handbook's foreword,
the committee chair urged states to make sure that their statutes
imposed penalties on corporations and unlicensed individuals who
undertook to practice law. 225 However, the ABA continued to
advocate that such statutes "should not undertake to define the
practice of the law, for definitions undertaking this have been
universally found to be self-limiting and to invite evasion. Whether or
not a particular course of conduct constitutes the practice of law
' 226
should be left to the courts for determination."

the Law, 35 COM. L.J. 722, 722 (1930). Henderson argued that "the profession is
entitled to have its work defined by the courts." Henderson, supra, at 722. He
reasoned that in Minnesota there was a constitutional basis for this power:
I contend that under our Constitution, the courts have complete authority
to define and regulate the practice of law, and to regulate the persons who
engage therein, whether they be licensed attorneys or not. The mere fact
that the legislature in some states has undertaken in a measure to exercise
some control by the passage of certain legislation does not exclude the
courts for the exercise of their own proper jurisdiction in the exclusive
domain of the judiciary .... I believe the less legislation on the subject the
better.
Id.at 722-23. Among other authority, Henderson cited Day. Id.at 722.
222. John G. Jackson, National Bar Program Questionnaire on Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, 20 A.B.A. J. 151, 151 (1934); Jefferson P. Chandler et al.,
Report of the Special Committee on Coordination of the Bar, 58 A.B.A. REPORTS
442-44 (1933) (discussing the formation of the National Bar Program).
223. Stanley B. Houch et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
Unauthorized Practiceof the Law, 60 A.B.A. REPORTS 522 (1935).
224. HICKS & KATZ, supra note 138.
225. Id.at 5.
226. Id.at 5-6; see also John G. Jackson, The Unauthorized Practice of the
Law, 12 NEB. L. BULL. 332, 334 (1933-34); John G. Jackson et al., Report of the
Special Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 58 A.B.A. REPORTS 483
(1933). Despite proposing that the courts should decide what conduct constituted the
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While the stated purpose of the Standing Committee on UPL was
to address both the corporate and individual unauthorized practice of
law, the primary focus of its activities continued to be on entities that
employed attorneys to provide legal services to their patrons.2 27 Thus,
at this time, the committee's rationale for curbing the unauthorized
practice of law continued to be on the integrity of the attorney, whom
such entities were using, but whose duty should be to the court and to
justice.228 However, the public and the press were tending to see the
practice of law, the bar associations were actively seeking informal agreements with
entities such as banks and trust companies regarding the proper scope of their
services. Because most lawsuits relating to the unauthorized practice of law were
being filed by bar associations, these informal agreements had the effect of allowing
the bar to determine the proper scope of these entities' activities. See, e.g.,
Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of American Bar Association, 59
A.B.A. REPORTS 163-64 (1934) (quoting agreements between the Chicago Bar
Association and corporate organizations such as trust companies); John G. Jackson
et al., Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 58
A.B.A. REPORTS 477-78 (1933) (Special Committee on UPL recommending that bar
associations use negotiation of agreements to end unauthorized practice activities by
title and abstract companies and, if that is unsuccessful, to file an action to enjoin
them from engaging in such activities); John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special
Committee on UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 57 A.B.A. REPORTS 565-66 (1932)
(discussing cooperative efforts between organized bars and bank and trust
companies); John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on
UnauthorizedPractice of the Law, 56 A.B.A. REPORTS 482-86 (1931) (summary of
unauthorized practice cases decided, which demonstrate that they were primarily
brought by practitioners and bar associations).
227. See, e.g., Proceedingsof the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of American
Bar Association, 59 A.B.A. REPORTS 154-55 (1934).
228. Id. at 159. The Standing Committee on UPL asked:
Can a high sense of service or a proper realization of duty to be performed
exist on the part of a lawyer whose daily living depends upon satisfying,
not the client to whom he really owes his service, but the man who gives
him his pay check at the end of the month or the man who solicits business
for him?
Id. The committee also proclaimed that the unauthorized practice of law was not an
evil because it took work away from lawyers, but because if "law work could be as
well accomplished in the interest of the public by laymen, the requirements of
honesty, learning and good character would not have been established and insisted
on as conditions precedent to the right to enter the profession." John G. Jackson et
al., Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 59
A.B.A. REPORTS, supra, at 531. The profession also continued to reason that the
unauthorized practice of law was harmful to the public. See, e.g., Roland G.
Swaffield, Unlawful Practice of the Law: The Profession's Responsibility in
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bars' efforts as acts of selfish protectionism. 229 As one New York
Times article noted, "Unauthorized practice must appeal to the selfpreservative instinct of every lawyer who doesn't have a hand in it."230
Some members of the bar still argued that it was beneficial to try
to define the practice of law. 23 1 As one member of the Seattle bar
wrote in 1930:
[W]e need a general acceptance of a new type of definition. We
need a delineation of the field which is exclusively legal; a
definition which excludes the activities of bankers, realtors, tax
advisors, insurance experts, accountants, investment counsel, ad
infinitum. We need a definition comprehending all matters which
should be ours exclusively, yet not including activities which are

Relation Thereto, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (1932) (discussing the unauthorized
practice of law's impact on the public welfare as well on its impact on
commercializing the legal profession).
229. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of American
Bar Association, 60 A.B.A. REPORTS 146 (1935); Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh
Annual Meeting of American Bar Association, 59 A.B.A. REPORTS 159-60 (1934);
Ralph T. Catterall, The Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 19 A.B.A. J. 652, 652
(1933) ("The lay public, for whose protection the restrictions exist, is not
interested."); Fred E. Gleason, UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 21 A.B.A. J. 243,
243 (1935) (discussing the bar's duty to "make plain to the public that the real
objection [to the unauthorized practice] is based on much higher and more
fundamental grounds [than self-interest]."); Taylor E. Groninger, Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 13 IND. L. J. 71, 71 (1937-38) (arguing that while lawyers may
initially seem like fee-grabbers, they are actually "acting in the interest of the public
welfare"); Lawyers Will Act Under Piper Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1937, at 39
(quoting chair of New York County Lawyer Association's committee on the
unauthorized practice of law who was promoting the public's interest in curbing the
unauthorized practice of law).
230. A National Bar Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1933, at 20. These
perceptions probably were not helped when courts ruled that it was improper for
attorneys to give free legal advice on the radio or for members of associations to
receive legal services through those associations. Larry Wolters, Radio Court
Feature May Come to City, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 17, 1936, at 21; High Court
Fines Motor Club for Legal Services, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 15, 1935, at 14.
231. See, e.g., Paul B. Ashley, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 16 A.B.A.
J. 558 (1930) (criticizing definitions enacted by legislatures to date, but still arguing
that better definitions would be beneficial to the public and to the profession).
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ours-competitively. More important, the
public needs such a
23
delineationfor its guidance and protection.

The ABA, however, had become very critical of any efforts to define
the practice of law and reasoned that "lay groups generally have
enough influence with the legislature to obtain undesirable exceptions
in their favor that are extremely dangerous." 233 A Report of the
Standing Committee on UPL further explained:
Bitter hostility toward the bar has been engendered by such
proposed legislation from realtors, title, and title insurance
companies, trade associations and other service organizations,
collection agencies and other similar groups which are engaged in
unlawful activities fully within the power of the courts unassisted to
prevent. These groups mistakenly think their activities are lawful
unless prohibited by statute; hence, the fight from their viewpoint is
against an unwarranted encroachment by the bar, and when
successful in defeating such legislation or emasculating it with
provisos and exceptions, they think their rights have been
confirmed and legalized. Disillusionment
is often accompanied by
234
deep resentment and lasting animosities.
Despite the ABA's new position that it was unwise for legislatures
to define the practice of law, between 1931 and 1933 a few state
legislatures enacted or amended a definition of "the practice of
law." 235 While the definitions varied somewhat, the Missouri statute
captures the essence of the definitions:
232. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Ashley also opined that defining the practice
of law to include only those areas that are exclusive to the legal profession might
have more success in the "legislatures which have balked at omnibus definitions."
Id.
233. Henry B. Brennan et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 64 A.B.A. REPORTS 269 (1939).

234. Id.
235. ALA. GEN. ACTS, § 1 (1931); 1931 GA. LAWS 191 (1931); LA. GEN.
STATUTES (Dart.), § 442 (1932); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 11692 (West 1932); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22-1213 (West 1930); 1933 TEX. GEN. LAWS 835 (1933), all

reprinted in HICKS & KATZ, supra note 138, at Part I. Some of these states had

previously enacted statutes that defined the practice of law. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §
6248 (1927), in THE ALABAMA CODE OF 1928: THE GENERAL LAWS TO AND
INCLUDING THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION OF 1927: COMPLETE ANNOTATIONS 1014 (A.

Hewson Michie, ed., Charlottesville, The Michie Co. 1929).
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The "practice of the law" is hereby defined to be and is the
appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity or the
drawing of papers, pleadings or documents or the performance of
any act in such capacity in connection with proceedings pending or
prospective before any court of record, commissioner, referee or
any body, board, committee or commission constituted by law or
having authority to settle controversies. The "law business" is
hereby defined to be and is the advising or counseling for a
valuable consideration of any person, firm, association, or
corporation as to any secular law or the drawing or the procuring of
or assisting in the drawing for a valuable consideration of any
paper, document or instrument affecting or relating to secular rights
or the doing of any act for a valuable consideration in a
representative capacity, obtaining or tending to obtain or securing
or tending to secure for any person, firm, association
or corporation
236
any property or property rights whatsoever.
Notwithstanding a handful of statutes being enacted, by the mid1930s the organized bar's position that the "practice of law" should
not be defined became the prevailing position.2 3 7 As the Standing
Committee on UPL reported in 1935:
Most of our state legislatures recently have met. Attempts again
have been made to solve unauthorized practice of law problems by
legislation. The incidents which have arisen out of these proposals
have caused the committee to review, analyze and seriously
reconsider its attitude, and its previously expressed views toward
such legislative efforts .... No legislative definition of the practice
of law should be attempted.23 8
Since 1933, hardly any state legislatures have enacted any type of
comprehensive definition of the practice of law. 239 The organized

236. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 11692 (West 1932), reprintedin HICKS & KATZ, supra
note 138, at 37.
237. Stanley B. Houck et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 60 A.B.A. REPORTS 522-23 (1935).

238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. Only seven states today have statutes
comprehensive definition of the practice of law, and
originally enacted between 1931-33. See ALA. CODE
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-19-51 (1993); LA. REv. STAT.

that attempt to provide a
many of those statutes were
§ 34-3-6 (LexisNexis 1992);
ANN. § 37:212 (1998); Mo.
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bar's next important move was to expand its position-not only was it
unwise for the legislatures to attempt to define the practice of law, the
organized bar began to argue that it was constitutionally
impermissible for them to do so.
C. The Organized Bar's Litigation Strategy and the Expansion of the
Inherent Powers Doctrine
In the 1930s, the organized bar had evolved from lobbyist to
litigant, which resulted in bar associations filing lawsuits to prohibit
the unauthorized practice of law in almost every jurisdiction. 240 It was
this litigation strategy that shaped the debate on the unauthorized
practice of law into a constitutional question that turned on the
separation of powers. The organized bar's litigation strategy included
arguments about the courts' inherent powers, which expanded on the
rationales already established in cases such as Day.24 1 Courts first held
that they had inherent power to punish those who engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, particularly through their contempt
powers, which did not require statutory authorization.242 The
ANN. STAT. § 484.010

CODE ANN.

(West 2006); N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 84-2.1 (2007), TEX. GOv'T

§ 81.101 (Vernon 2006), TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-101 (2007). A

minority of courts have adopted a definition of the practice of law through their rule
making powers. See, e.g., ALASKA BAR RULE 63; ARIZ. SUP. CT. RULE 31; CONN.
RULES FOR THE SUP. CT. § 2-44A; KY SUP. CT. RULE 3.020; UTAH SUP. CT. RULE 1
(2005); VA. SUP. CT. RULE., Part 6, § 1; WA GEN. RULE 24; WY. SUP. CT. RULE
11.1.
240. See Garner W. Denmead et al., Unauthorized Practice of Law, 4 INS.
COUNSEL J. 75, 75 (1937) ("In practically every state, Bar Associations have
instituted proceedings to prohibit laymen from continuing to perform work that is
claimed to constitute the practice of law .... "); Sanders, supra note 135, at 1-2
(noting that in a 1937 compilation of cases relating to the unauthorized practice of
law, the first 98 pages were devoted to cases before 1930 and the rest of the 838
pages dealt with cases after 1930).
241. See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Fitchette v. Taylor, 254 N.W. 910, 911 (Minn. 1934) ("[T]he
admission to practice of attorneys and their disbarment is a part of the judicial power
allocated to the court by the departmentalization of our government ....
[I]t would
be anomalous if we had no similar power to protect the public from the illegal
practice of law by laymen.") (citations omitted); People ex rel. I11.State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yard State Bank, 176 N.E. 901, 906 (I11. 1931) ("Of what avail is the
power to license in the absence of power to prevent one not licensed from practicing
as an attorney?").

2009]

LOBBYING AND LITIGATING AGAINST "LEGAL BOOTLEGGERS"

119

extension of this proposition was that the courts had the power to
determine what constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 243 And, if
the courts had the power to determine what constituted the
unauthorized practice of law, then, they further reasoned, they must
have the exclusive power to define what constituted the practice of
law.2 44
One of the earliest overt clashes between the legislature and courts
over the power to define the practice of law arose in 1936 in the
Louisiana case of Meunier v. Bernich.24 5 In Meunier, the parents of a
child killed in a railroad accident contracted with a nonlawyer claims
adjuster to investigate and settle their claim. The railroad offered $150
to settle, which the parents refused. They then hired an attorney who
resolved the case for $4,000. Under the parents' contract with the
claims adjuster, he was entitled to a 25% fee for investigating the
claims and preparing the case for the attorney to take over. The
parents refused to pay, so the claims adjuster sued them for
payment.2 4 6
The parents argued their contract with the claims adjuster was
void and violated public policy because the claims adjuster was
practicing law without a license. 247 The claims adjuster argued his
business was specifically exempted from the definition of the practice
of law that the state legislature had adopted.2 4 8 The parents conceded

243. See cases cited infra note 257.
244. See, e.g., R.I. Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. 139, 142 (R.I.
1935) ("Authority to admit to the bar and to disbar necessarily carries with it power
to define what constitutes the practice of law."). But see Eagle Indem. Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 18 P.2d 341, 342-43 (Cal. 1933) (holding that the Legislature did
have the authority to permit nonlawyers to appear before the Industrial Accident
Commission). California still permits its legislature to carve out exceptions to what
might otherwise be considered the practice of law. The holding in Eagle was
affirmed as recently as 2006. Benninghoff v. Superior Ct., 136 Cal. App. 4th 61, 70
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). This minority position likely explains why California statutes
authorize nonlawyer legal document preparers. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §

6400, et seq. (West 2003).
245. Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. Ct. App. 1936).
246. Id. at 570.
247. Id.
248. Id. The Louisiana statute defined the practice of law, in part, as follows:
[T]he doing of any act, in behalf of another, tend[ing] to obtain or secure
for such other the prevention or the redress of a wrong, or the enforcement
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the adjuster's acts were exempted under the statute, but they argued
that the statute was an unconstitutional encroachment on the inherent
power of the judiciary. 249 The Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law of the New Orleans Bar Association intervened in the
25 0
lawsuit to support the parents' arguments.
The lower court ruled for the claims adjuster and the parents and
intervener appealed.2
On appeal, the court framed the question as
follows:
[H]as the Legislature power, under the general grant of police
power bestowed on it by the Constitution, to prescribe the rules and
regulations concerning the various acts which may or may not be
considered as being the practice of law (which necessarily would
confer upon it the right to define the practice of law), or, does the
power to regulate the practice 252
of law lie inherently in the judicial
department of our government?
The parents and intervener conceded the legislature may enact
statutes to aid the inherent power of the courts, such as setting
minimum standards for admission to the bar, but they contended it did
not have the power to "encroach upon or frustrate the power invested
in the courts by the passage of statutes tending to prescribe maximum
requirements for those desiring to engage in the law practice., 25 3 The
court recognized the powers of the courts are not defined or
enumerated in the Constitution, and that courts have sometimes found
it necessary "to exert powers which were never expressly bestowed
upon them by the Constitution or by statute." 25 4 Here, the court held
that statutory exceptions tended to destroy its authority over the legal
profession. It reasoned:

or establishment of a right, except, without resort to court proceedings, the
enforcing, securing, settling, adjusting or compromising of defaulted,
controverted or disputed accounts, or claims.
LA. GEN. STAT. § 443 (1932), reprinted in HICKS & KATZ, supra note 138, at 27.
249. Meunier, 170 So. at 570.
250. Id.
251. Id.

252. Id. at 571.
253. Id. at 573-74.
254. Id. at 574.
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If the courts have the inherent power to prescribe rules and
regulations for those seeking admission to the bar and if the court
has the authority to discipline or disbar members of the legal
profession, it follows that the scope of power residing in the
judiciary embraces the right to define, by court rules, or by
adjudication as cases may arise, the acts constituting the practice of
law; for, if it were otherwise, the Legislature could, as it has
attempted to do in this case, nullify and render ineffective the
inherent judicial authority, by providing that a certain course of
conduct by laymen is not the practice of law, in the face of previous
adjudications by the court describing and 25defining
the functions of
5
the lawyer in the pursuit of his profession.
The court held "[w]hen the Legislature passes a statute which attempts
to define the practice of law, it directly impinges upon the
constitutional grant of power bestowed upon the courts respecting the
' 2 56
regulation of the conduct of the members of the legal profession."
Most courts faced with similar issues have adopted reasoning
comparable to Meunier and held that the judiciary has the exclusive
power to define the practice of law. 2 57 A few judges in the 1930s
questioned this reasoning, but their position never gained much
support. For example, in Clark v. Austin, the Missouri Supreme Court
255. Id. at 575. The court reiterated that the legislature may act to aid the
inherent powers of the court, but the court will not tolerate any legislation that tends
to strip it of its inherent powers. Id. at 575-76.
256. Id. at 577.
257. See, e.g., In re Pate, 107 S.W.2d 157, 162 (Mo. 1937) (holding that,
although the state Constitution does not vest any particular branch of government
with the power to define the practice of law, it most naturally belongs to the judicial
branch); Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Mo. 1937) ("[T]his court has
inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law independent of any statute
on the subject."); In re Unification of Mont. Bar Ass'n, 87 P.2d 172, 173 (Mont.
1939) (holding that, although the state Constitution does not vest any particular
branch of government with the power to define the practice of law, it most naturally
belongs to the judicial branch); State ex rel. Hunter v. Kirk, 276 N.W. 380, 382
(Neb. 1937) (same); In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 268
(Neb. 1937) ("The practice of law is so intimately connected and bound up with the
exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to define and
regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department of our
state government."); Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, 12 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Ohio
1937) ("[T]he power to regulate, control and define the practice of law reposes in
the judicial branch of the government.").
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held that it had the exclusive power to define the practice of law and,
therefore, statutes defining the practice of law are unconstitutional.258
Chief Justice Ellison of Missouri, however, believed the statutes
were valid. 259 He argued that there was a role for both the legislature
and the judiciary, which the court had previously recognized with its
acknowledgement that the legislature may enact statutes to aid the
judicial branch. 260 Here, Chief Justice Ellison argued, the court went
further and held that its powers over the regulation of the practice of
law were exclusive. 261 He concluded that the logical extension of the
court's holding would be to find that a whole body of law, including
the entire code of civil procedure, would have to be declared
unconstitutional.262
The chief justice did not think the judicial branch had exclusive
powers over the regulation of the legal profession because such a
holding would deny the legislative branch its ability to exercise its
police powers. 263 He believed the legislature should have a voice in
these areas because, "The ultimate objective of both departments may
be the same-the good of the people in the administration of justice;
but the powers are fundamentally different. The courts' power
essentially is protective and self-serving; the legislative power is to
advance the public welfare." 264 Chief Justice Ellison's opinion
concluded that the legislature should be able to enact laws in the area
of the regulation of the practice of law; however, he still believed the

258. Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Mo. 1937).
259. Id. at 985 (Ellison, C.J., concurring and dissenting). The chief justice
agreed the respondents in the case behaved improperly, but he believed they violated
the statute as drafted. He did not think it was proper to hold the statutes
unconstitutional and then punish the respondents through the court's inherent
contempt powers. Id.
260. Id.at 985-86.
261. Id.
262. Id.at 986.
263. Id.at 994 ("Courts do not exercise the police power .... If the courts
were lax and slothful in regulating the practice of law, it would hardly be contended
lawyers would be left free to prey upon the public, because, forsooth, they are
officers of the court, and that the legislative department would be helpless.").
264. Id.
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judiciary had the power to strike down any laws that unreasonably
26 5
encroached upon its powers.
That same month, in People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v.
Goodman, a dissenting justice argued the inherent powers of the court
should not extend beyond those who appear in the courts. 2 66 In
Goodman, the Chicago Bar Association brought an action against a
nonlawyer who was adjusting workmen's compensation claims for a
contingency fee. 267 The CBA successfully argued that his conduct was
268
the unauthorized practice of law.
The majority opinion held it had the inherent power to regulate
and define the practice of law and to discipline those who engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.2 69 One of the dissenting justices,
however, argued that the inherent power of the court should be limited
to its "power to refuse to accept as its officers any who are not
acceptable to it." 270 He argued that if "the Legislature may not tell us
whom shall be admitted as attorneys, it follows inexorably that we
cannot tell the administrative or executive department whom they
shall receive before their boards or commissions.,,271 These minority
opinions have not prevailed in the unauthorized practice of law
jurisprudence.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE COURTS'
INHERENT POWERS TO DEFINE THE PRACTICE OF LAW

For purposes of this article, several assumptions will be made.
First, this article will assume that the judicial departments possess
certain inherent powers that are not explicitly enumerated in state
constitutions, but which are necessary for their proper functioning as
an independent branch of government. Next, this article will assume
that the regulation of the legal profession-meaning the power to
determine who shall be admitted to the bar, disciplined, or disbarred265. Id. at 994-95.
266. People ex rel. Chi. Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941, 948-49 (Ill.
1937) (Orr, J., dissenting).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 947 (majority opinion).
269. Id. at 944.
270. Id. at 950 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
271. Id.
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is one of the inherent powers of the courts. Lastly, this article will
assume that courts have the inherent power to determine who shall
appear before them, subject to constitutional limitations such as the
right to appear pro se. 272 What this last section of the article examines
is the conclusion that, deriving from the foregoing assumptions, the
judicial departments must have the exclusive power to define the
practice of law-including determining what acts outside the
courtroom constitute the unauthorized practice of law-in order to
maintain their status as an independent branch of government. The
evidence suggests that the constitutional footings on which this
conclusion is based are not strong.
As an initial matter, no state constitution explicitly grants the
judicial branch the power to define the practice of law. 273 Several
modem amendments to constitutions do provide that the judicial
branch has the power to regulate the practice of law, including the
admission and disbarment of attorneys, and general rule-making
powers. 274 Courts have construed these provisions as granting them
the power to define the practice of law, 275 but the plain language of

272. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment provides individuals with a constitutional right to represent themselves
pro se in criminal proceedings). Because individuals do not have a right to counsel
in civil cases, it follows that they also have the right to represent themselves pro se
in civil actions in order to have access to the courts. See, e.g., Muka v. N.Y. State
Bar Ass'n, 466 N.Y.S.2d 891, 895 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("The right to represent oneself
in both civil and criminal matters is basic to our system of justice."). The federal
courts and many state courts have affirmed this by statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (2006) ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct
their own cases personally .. ."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 321 (McKinney 2003) ("A party..
. may prosecute or defend a civil action in person or by an attorney .... "); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. d (2000)

("Every jurisdiction recognizes the right of an individual to proceed 'pro se'....").
273. See Beardsley, supra note 27, at 510 (arguing that "[t]he claim of an
implied grant of power imputes to those who framed and adopted our constitutions
an intention that finds no supporting evidence in the constitutional provisions
creating the judicial departments, or elsewhere.").
274. E.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 28; COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21; Mo. CONST.
art. V, § 5; N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
275. See, e.g., Neal v. Wilson, 873 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Ark. 1994) (holding that
rule-making powers in the state constitution gives the court the power to regulate
and define the practice of law).
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these provisions could be construed to include only the power to
admit, disbar, and discipline attorneys.
Next, the inherent powers doctrine was expanded to include the
power to define the practice of law as the direct result of the organized
bar's strategic shift from lobbyist to litigant. 276 The circumstances and
timing of this strategic shift suggest that the bar's main motivation
was to protect the legal profession from competition, as opposed to
protecting the independence of the judicial branch. The organized
bar's strategic shift occurred after the start of the Great Depression,
when the economic pressures on the profession had intensified.2 77
Thus, the organized bar had economic motivation to limit competition
2 78
from nonlawyers and corporations.
The evidence further suggests that the organized bar abandoned
its legislative strategy not because of separation of powers concerns,
but because its influence in the legislatures was weak 279 and it feared
that the lobbying efforts of other interest groups would lead to
28 0
infringement on the scope of the legal profession's monopoly.
Overall, the organized bar appears to have concluded that the
legislature was not a friendly forum for its agenda. 8 ' Notably, the
reports of bar association meetings did not articulate protecting the
independence of the judicial branch of government as part of its
agenda. It became necessary, however, for the organized bar to argue
that the judicial branch needed the exclusive power to define the
practice of law once the bar started to assert that the legislatures
282
should not be involved in defining the practice of law.
Lastly, the Meunier court articulated the basic reasoning courts
have used when holding that the judicial departments must have the
power to define the practice of law-namely, that if the courts have
276.

See supra Part 1II.B-C.

277. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83, 190-93.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83, 190-93.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60, 195-97; see also Beardsley,
supra note 27, at 510 (arguing that one of the reasons the inherent powers doctrine
persists is because "it is not always easy to persuade legislatures to pass progressive
legislation.").
280. See supra text accompanying note 233.
281. The legal profession had a long history of unfavorable treatment by the
legislatures. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
282. See supra Part IH.B.
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the power to determine who shall be admitted to practice law, then the
courts must be able to define what acts constitute the practice of
law. 283 There is, however, evidence to suggest that this is not a
necessary conclusion.
An examination of the federal system provides strong evidence
that other branches of government can be involved in defining tasks
that nonlawyers may perform outside the courtroom-i.e., defining
activities that are not the unauthorized practice of law-without
impairing the independence of the judicial branch. Federal courts
license attorneys to appear before them and have the power to punish
improper conduct by attorneys, as well as nonlawyers, in connection
with proceedings before the federal courts.284 However, with respect
to activities outside the courthouse, the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government have authorized nonlawyers to
perform services that could be considered the practice of law. 285 For
example, while the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize
nonlawyers to prepare bankruptcy petitions for a fee, its section that
governs the conduct of nonlawyer "bankruptcy petition preparers"
implicitly authorizes such conduct. 286 Also, many federal statutes and
regulations authorize nonlawyers to appear in a representative
capacity in many types of administrative proceedings. 287 Therefore,
nonlawyers can, and do, perform tasks that lawyers also perform.
When nonlawyers engage in such tasks, consumers do not
necessarily benefit from the attorney-client privilege, client
protections contained in the rules of ethics, the ability to bring
283. See Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. Ct. App. 1936).
284. These federal courts have held that they have the right to determine who
will appear before them and neither state statutes nor state courts can determine who
may appear in federal proceedings. E.g., United States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp.
608, 614 (E.D. La. 1990).
285. See infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
286. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (2006).
287. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2006) (permitting federal agencies to
determine whether nonlawyers may appear in administrative proceedings in a
representative capacity); 26 C.F.R. § 601.502 (2009) (permitting certain nonlawyers
to represent taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service), 49 C.F.R. §§ 511.71511.73 (2009) (permitting nonlawyers to represent parties before the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration); see also Johnstone, supra note 198, at 9-11
(discussing federal agencies permitting laymen to appear in a representative
capacity).
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malpractice claims, or the ability to report conduct to disciplinary
commissions. 22888 This does not, however, mean that consumers are left
with no recourse if nonlawyers mishandle their affairs. Civil actions
such as negligence claims and consumer protection laws still provide
protection for those who choose to utilize a nonlawyer for certain
2 89
tasks that a lawyer might also perform outside the courtroom.
Whether consumers choose to pay for an attorney and the
accompanying benefits, or to hire a nonlawyer, is a matter of
consumer choice in situations where nonlawyers can compete. There
is no evidence to suggest that this has undermined the independence
of the judicial branch in the federal system, which would suggest that
the independence of state judicial departments could survive similar
efforts by state legislatures.
V. THE MODERN IMPACT OF THE EXPANSION OF THE INHERENT
POWERS DOCTRINE IN THE 1930S AND 40s

As a result of the organized bar's strategy in the 1930s and 40s,
legislatures have not defined the practice of law, and the courts
usually only grapple with the issue when it arises in the context of a
specific litigated controversy. Even then, they often find the task
difficult. 290 The impact of this result is two-fold. First, nonlawyers
288. See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The
Standard of Carefor the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 87, 96100 (2007) (discussing different approaches courts have taken with respect to the
standard of care for legal activities by nonlawyers).
289. Id.; see also Richard F. Mallen & Assocs. v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp.,
769 N.E.2d 74, 75 (I11.App. Ct. 2002) (licensed attorneys alleged claims against
nonlawyers under the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act).
290. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962)
("Many courts have attempted to set forth a broad definition of the practice of law.
Being of the view that such is nigh onto impossible and may injuriously affect the
rights of others not here involved, we will not attempt to do so here."); Denver Bar
Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 391 P.2d 467, 471 (Colo. 1964) ("There is no wholly
satisfactory definition as to what constitutes the practice of law; it is not easy to give
an all-inclusive definition."); People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 87
N.E.2d 773, 776 (Ill. 1949) ("It would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a
formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law."); Cowern v. Nelson,
290 N.W. 795, 797 (Minn. 1940) ("The line between what is and what is not the
practice of law cannot be drawn with precision."); Creditors' Serv. Corp. v.
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frequently lack clear guidance regarding what tasks they may perform
until the matter is litigated, and second, consumers have limited
choices with respect to assistance for their legal issues.
Regarding the first impact, because legislatures cannot define the
practice of law, and courts have rarely done so through their
rulemaking powers, nonlawyers often do not receive meaningful
guidance as to what tasks they may legitimately perform until they
engage in the conduct and a lawsuit is subsequently filed. 29 ' The
absence of a clear delineation of what constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law was of significant concern to certain business
industries in the 1930s that were concerned about the organized bar's
increased litigation activity. For example, realtors became concerned
when state bar associations began filing suits that would prohibit real
estate agents from filling out forms such as preliminary contracts,
simple deeds, leases, and mortgages. 292 The Executive Vice President
of the National Association of Real Estate Boards wrote:
It may be pointed out that if there be such a thing as the
unauthorized practice of the law, there must be such a thing as the
authorized practice of the law. Yet it is difficult to find any

definition that fits the phrases. Lawyers and jurists have been
satisfied with broad generalizations. Some of the state bar
associationshave frankly advised that there should be no attempt to
formulate such definitions and I believe I may say that the
committee of the American Bar Association on the subject, headed
by Mr. Stanley B. Houck, of Minneapolis, made it clear to my
Association that the bar does not consider it possible or desirable
that the so-called authorized practice of law shall be defined. In
Cummings, 190 A. 2, 9 (R.I. 1937) ("What constitutes the practice of law is
extremely difficult, if not unwise, to even attempt to define, and so the determination
of any issue that presents this question must be left to the facts in each particular
case.").
291. See Quintin Johnstone, UnauthorizedPractice of Law and the Power of
State Courts: Difficult Problems and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETrE L. REv.

795, 806-15 (2003) (discussing areas where prohibitions on the unauthorized
practice of law are clear and where they are vague and ambiguous).
292. Herbert U. Nelson, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem
from the Standpoint of Realtors, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 57-59 (1938);
Warning is Voiced of Realty Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1937, at RE2 (quoting

Herbert U. Nelson's concerns about the litigation being instituted by state and local
bars against the real estate community).
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come some attempt to establishfrontiers
fairness, surely, there must
293
or lines of demarcation.

Attempts to establish lines of demarcation did occur, but
ironically not by the courts or the legislatures. Even though the bar's
litigation strategy resulted in favorable court decisions, 294 in the late
1930s the bar convened with other professionals, such as realtors, to
negotiate the lines of demarcation and memorialize them in
declarations of principles or consent decrees.29 5 Through these
statements of principles and consent decrees, it was private trade
groups, not the courts or the legislatures, that were defining the
appropriate scope of nonlawyer activities.29 6 This effectively removed
the question from the reach of any branch of government and any
democratic participation by citizens, and allowed private industries to
dictate the scope of the practice of law and areas of competition
between lawyers and nonlawyers. Such agreements have largely been
293. Nelson, supra note 292, at 59 (emphasis added). The author expressed
concern that without any clear definition of the practice of law, a real estate agent "is
constantly moving at his own peril without a knowledge of what the law is." Id. at
60. He encouraged the bar to submit appropriate legislation to the various states to
clearly define the practice of law "so that all citizens may know their rights and
obligations in this respect, and so that no one going about the ordinary conduct of
his business affairs need be subjected to legislation that is not in the books as such
but that exists by reason of judicial interpretation by the various courts." Id.
294. See supra Part III.C.
295. See, e.g., Henry B. Brennan et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 64 A.B.A. REPORTS 271-76 (1939) (discussing
consent decrees and statements of principles agreed upon between various bar
associations and insurance companies, banks, trust companies, and collection
agencies); Edwin M. Otterbourg et al., Report of the Standing Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 66 A.B.A. REPORTS 274-75, 277-78 (1941)
(statements of principles with the American Bankers Associations Trust Division);
Edwin M. Otterbourg et al., Resolution Adopted between the Standing Committee on
UnauthorizedPracticeof Law of the American Bar Association and Representatives
of the National Association of Real Estate Boards on May 5, 1942, at Memphis
Tennessee, in 67 A.B.A. REPORTS 224-25 (1942); HICKS & KATZ, supra note 138, at
122-71 (compilation of statement of principles adopted); see also Johnstone, supra
note 198, at 22-29 (discussing agreements entered into between the American Bar
Association and eight competing businesses); see also supra note 226.
296. See, e.g., Real Estate and Law to be Kept Distinct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1942, at RE2 (discussing conference between lawyers and real estate men to
determine proper contours of each profession).
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abandoned because of their potential anti-trust implications, although
tacit agreements may still exist. 297 Since the rescission or
abandonment of statements of principles between industry groups, the
responsibility of defining the practice of law and the appropriate scope
of activities by nonlawyers has remained with the judicial
departments, usually on a case-by-case basis.298
If the organized bar had been successful in lobbying the state
legislatures to enact a definition of the practice of law, it is possible
that the state legislatures would still have a role today in defining what
acts constitute the practice of law and what acts nonlawyers may
perform without causing undue consumer harm, much as we see to
some extent in the federal system. 299 This could have led to different
categories of professionals-attorneys, independent paralegals, legal
document preparers, nonlawyer bankruptcy advisors, etc.-similar to
the diverse fields within the medical profession where legislatures
have, through the exercise of their police powers, provided the public
30 0
with a variety of options when faced with a medical problem.
Different categories of professionals with different levels of training

297. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34
STAN. L. REv. 1, 9-10, 20-21 (1981) (discussing statements of principles and noting
that even where they have been formally abandoned, there still exists informal or
tacit agreements among the bar and various industries).
298. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Nev. 2008)
("[W]hat constitutes the practice of law must be determined on a case-by-case
basis."). Washington has taken a different route and has enacted a rule that
specifically authorizes nonlawyers to engage in limited tasks that might otherwise be
considered the unauthorized practice of law. WASH. SUP. CT. RULE 24(b).
299. See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
300. For example, in California, the following licenses (among others) are
available in the health care field: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1000-04 (West 2003)
(chiropractors); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2080-99, et seq. (West 2003)
(physicians and surgeons); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2505-21 (West 2003)
(midwives and nurse-midwives); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2834-37 (West 2003)
(nurse practitioners); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2830-33.6 (West 2003) (clinical
nurse specialists); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2940-51 (West 2003)
(psychologists); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3500 (West 2003) (physician's
assistants); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 3610-15 (West 2003) (naturopathic
doctors); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 4935-49 (West 2003) (acupuncturists).
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and fees, could potentially increase access to the legal system, 30 1 as
well as reduce the cost of utilizing the legal system. 30 2 Such options
have never been fully explored as a result of the trajectory set by the
efforts of the organized bar in the 1930s and 40s.
If only the courts can constitutionally define the practice of law,
then a constitutional amendment is required to overrule a court's
decision about the scope of the legal profession's monopoly. For
example, in Arizona the court held that only attorneys could fill out
and complete forms associated with real estate transactions such as
deeds, mortgages, and contracts for the sale of real estate. 30 3 Unhappy
with this ruling, the citizens of Arizona amended the state constitution
301. Cf. Benjamin G. Druss et al., Trends in Care by Nonphysician Clinicians
in the United States, 348 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 130 (2003) (examining trends in
outpatient care between 1987 and 1997 when the passage of legislation increased the
scope and number of nonphysician clinicians, which resulted in an increase of the
population who saw a nonphysician clinician from 30.6% to 36.1%); Edward S.
Sekscenski et al., State PracticeEnvironments and the Supply of Physician
Assistants, Nurse Practitioners,and Certified Nurse-Midwives, 331 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 1266 (1994) (analyzing the increase in the number of physician assistants,
nurse practitioners and certified nurse-midwives in states with favorable practice
environments for those professions and noting their ability to increase access to
primary care). These sources explain that there is evidence in the health care field
that the increased availability of additional types of health care providers has
increased access to health care.
302. The Federal Trade Commission has frequently expressed concerns that
prohibiting laypersons from engaging in conduct that does not require specialized
legal training-such as conducting real estate closings, writing advocacy letters,
writing amicus curie briefs, and serving as mediators-limits consumer choice and
increases the costs of services to consumers. See, e.g., Letter from the Fed. Trade
Comm'n Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Econ. to
Carl E. Testo, Counsel for the Rules Comm. of the Superior Court of Conn. (May
17, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/be/V070006.pdf (expressing concerns that a proposed
rule to define the practice of law would be interpreted in an overly broad manner
and would have a negative impact on consumers and competition); Letter from Fed.
Trade Comm'n & Dep't of Justice to N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm. (December 14,
(expressing opposition to recent
2001), http://www.ftc.gov/beV020006.shtm
opinions requiring the presence of an attorney at all real estate closings, and
providing empirical data regarding the increased costs to consumers when
nonlawyers cannot compete in the area of real estate closings); see also John P.
Brown, The Pros and Cons of Competition, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 15557 (Douglas J. Besharov, ed. 1990).
303. State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title and Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 14-15
(Ariz. 1961), supplemented by 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962).

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

to provide that any individual holding a valid license as a real estate
broker or salesperson "shall have the right to draft or fill out and
complete, without charge, any and all instruments incident thereto
including, but not limited to, preliminary purchase agreements and
earnest money receipts, deeds, mortgages, leases, assignments,
releases, contracts for sale of realty, and bills of sale. '30 4 A
constitutional amendment, however, is an onerous process by which to
experiment and explore areas where nonlawyers can compete with
30 5
lawyers.
There may, however, be some room for legislatures to act in this
area and challenge the precedent regarding the power of the judicial
branches. As an initial matter, while the courts have claimed the
power to define the practice of law, they have largely avoided the
concomitant responsibility to do so. 306 Even with rulemaking powers,
few judicial departments have attempted to enact a comprehensive
definition of the practice of law. 30 7 Deciding what acts constitute the
unauthorized practice of law on a case-by-case basis may have an
undue chilling effect on businesses, competition, and consumer
choice. Furthermore, the language of the decisional law leaves a crack
in the door for legislative involvement because many of the decisions
state that the legislature may regulate in the area of the legal
30 8
profession if it "aids the court."
304. ARIZ. CONST. art. 26, § 1.
305. See Johnstone, supra note 291, at 842-43 (discussing ways to reduce the
courts' power over the unauthorized practice of law including constitutional
amendments); Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role
of the Inherent Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 19 (1989-90)

(discussing the difficulty with constitutional amendments as a way to reform the
inherent powers doctrine).
306. See supra note 290.
307. See supra note 239.

308. See, e.g., Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 576 (La. Ct. App. 1936)
("Due to the fact that courts are not empowered to enact laws, the jurisprudence has
approved legislation passed in aid of the courts' inherent powers."). Some courts
have also said they will defer to reasonable legislation, although "this deference is
one of comity or courtesy, rather than an acknowledgement of power." State v.
Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 605 (Wis. 1928). See also Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer
Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent Powers Doctrine, 12 U.

ARK. LrrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 19-20 (1989-90) (suggesting that legislatures try to reduce
the broad scope of the definition of the unauthorized practice of law as one possible
way to increase public participation in legal reform).
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If state legislatures became more active in assessing and
authorizing tasks that nonlawyers can provide to consumers, 30 9 which
might otherwise be considered the practice of law, the main resistance
would likely come from the organized bar. 3 10 The organized bar
should, however, reconsider its position on this issue. First, as
discussed, the history of its position raises questions about the
constitutional footings of its separation of powers arguments. Second,
when the organized bar resists competition, it puts the legal profession
in the position of being the main obstruction to exploring ways to
increase access to the legal system.
The legal profession has never met, and likely never will meet, the
legal needs of the population. 3 11 Thus, consumers could likely benefit
from nonlawyers performing some tasks that lawyers traditionally
perform. 3 12 Increased nonlawyer assistance could be accomplished by

309. For articles discussing the role that the legislature should have in
regulating the legal profession, see generally: Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional
Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts,
Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167 (2003); Thomas P. Bingman,
Separation of Powers: Who Should Control the Bar?, 47 J. URB. L. 715 (1969);
Johnstone, supra note 198; Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11
and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choicesfor
the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 765 (2003-04).
310. As a plaintiff or an intervenor, the organized bar continues to be the main
proponent of arguments that nonlawyer conduct is the unauthorized practice of law.
See, e.g., Richard F. Mallen & Assoc. v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 769 N.E.2d 74,
75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (plaintiff was a personal injury attorney who filed an action
on behalf of all Illinois attorneys practicing personal injury law, and the Illinois
State Bar Association was granted leave to file an amicus brief).
311. See RHODE, supra note 134, at 103. For example, a 2005 study regarding
the legal needs of low-income Illinoisans ("Illinois Report") found that low income
residents of Illinois faced over 1.3 million civil legal problems in 2003. LAWYERS
TRUST FUND OF ILL. ET AL., THE LEGAL AID SAFETY NET: A REPORT ON THE LEGAL
NEEDS OF Low-INCOME ILLINOISANS 1-2 (2005), http://www.ltf.org/docs/
legalneeds.pdf. Low income households in Illinois had legal assistance for only one
out of every six of these legal problems, which meant that this population handled
1.1 million legal problems without legal assistance. Id. See also ALBERT H.
CANTRIL, ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE,
at vii (1996) (noting that about half of low and moderate income families face a
legal problem each year, but a large portion of those problems never become part of
the legal system).
312. Many modem scholars who have examined the issue have concluded that
there are some legal services that nonlawyers could provide competently. See, e.g.,
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defining certain services that nonlawyers may provide, which would
allow nonlawyers to provide some legal services without the
supervision of an attorney. 313 If appropriate, this could require some
level of training and licensure. Allowing nonlawyers to provide some
services that are generally considered the practice of law could also
increase competition and lower prices for services provided by
attorneys. 314 The result would be increased consumer choice and more
access to the legal system for the largely underserved low and middle
class population. 315 When a substantial portion of the population lacks
meaningful access to the legal system, the rule of law is threatened.3 16
As proponents of the rule of law, the organized bar should reconsider
whether it wants to continue being a barrier to exploring ways to

RHODE, supra note 134, at 15, 87. Other countries have allowed nonlawyers to
perform some services that only lawyers may provide in the United States, and there
has been no evidence of consumer harm from these policies. Id. at 89. See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4, cmt. c (2000)

(noting that in the few states that have allowed extensive nonlawyer provision of
legal services, there has been no indication of any significant risks to consumers);
ALBERT H. CANTRIL, ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND

CIVIL JUSTICE 11-12 (1996) (recommendations in the ABA's 1996 report on access
to justice also included "find new ways for lawyers to work with nonlegal third
parties and expand roles for paralegals."); Alan Morrison, Making Competition
Work, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 150-55 (Douglas J. Besharov, ed. 1990);
Thomas D. Zilavy & Andrew J. Chevrez, The UnauthorizedPractice of Law: Court
Tells Profession, Show Us the Harm, 78 Wis. LAW., Oct. 2005, at 8. But see Drew
A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro
Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 1537 (2005).
313. We can find a couple of examples of this. In California, the legislature
passed a statute that authorizes nonlawyers to act as Legal Document Assistants.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6400 et seq. (West 2003). In Washington, the Supreme
Court enacted a rule that authorizes nonlawyers to perform limited tasks such as
acting as a lay representative in administrative tribunals. WASH. SUP. CT. RULE
24(b).
314. See supra note 302.
315. RHODE, supra note 134, at 7, 13-14, 103 (discussing underserved
populations and insufficient access to legal assistance).
316. See Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 413, 431 (2003); cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Don't Forget the Lawyers:
The Role of Lawyers in Promoting the Rule of Law in Emerging Market
Democracies,46 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 416-19 (2007).
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increase access to the legal system.3 17 Thus, it may be time to
3 18
reconsider its litigation strategy that started in the 1930s.
CONCLUSION

The inherent power of the courts to define the practice of law
merits reexamination for several reasons. Courts expanded the
inherent powers doctrine under circumstances that raise questions
about whether the inherent power to define the practice of law is
necessary for the judicial branches to maintain their independence. It
was the organized bar that made this argument, but it may have done
so because it believed the courts would be a more amenable forum to
their economic interests than the legislatures. Evidence suggests that
in the 1930s and 40s the organized bar abandoned efforts for
legislative reform not because of concerns about the separation of
powers, but because the legislatures had not proved to be friendly
forums for the organized bar's agenda, and the bar feared the
influence of other interest groups in the legislative process.
Furthermore, the impact of the trajectory that was set by the
organized bar's change in strategy from lobbyist to litigant in the
1930s has been to exclude the legislative branches from exercising
their police powers in an important area of regulation. If state
legislatures cannot speak to the issue of what acts are and are not the
practice of law, then they cannot assess and authorize services that
nonlawyers might provide to consumers without undue harm. If
legislatures could act in this area, then a stratified legal profession

317. Many members of the bar provide numerous hours of pro bono services.
While these efforts are laudable, they have not come close to meeting the legal
needs of the population and are not likely to do so unless pro bono work is required
of all attorneys. See, e.g., ALBERT H. CANTRIL, ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CivIL JUSTICE 26-28 (1996) (noting that "[flewer than one
in six private attorneys participate in pro bono programs"). The ABA was
unsuccessful with its efforts in 1983, 1993, and 2001 to have the Model Rules of

Professional Conduct require some amount of pro bono service as a mandatory
obligation. Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 413, 426 (2003).
318. See Beardsley, supra note 27, at 511 (arguing that the "inherent power
doctrine is more readily utilized as a bar, than as an aid, to progress," and the
doctrine is detrimental to the courts and the bar with respect to their standing with
the public).
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could develop with persons other than lawyers providing some limited
services. In the federal system, for example, the executive and
legislative branches have authorized nonlawyers to perform acts such
as assisting with the preparation of bankruptcy petitions and appearing
in a representative capacity in administrative proceedings without an
adverse impact on the balance of power among the federal branches of
government.
If legislatures were engaged in determining and authorizing
services that nonlawyers could provide, the main resistance would
likely come from the organized bar. The bar should, however, reassess
its response to such efforts. The legal profession should have an
interest in improving access to the legal system and should
acknowledge that the legal profession has not met all of the legal
needs of the citizenry, and it is unlikely to do so anytime in the
foreseeable future. There may be areas where persons with lesser
training, such as independent paralegals, could fill in some of the gaps
in the delivery of legal services. The legislatures would be the
appropriate place to explore such options, but the organized bar's
litigation efforts have extinguished legislative involvement.
Legislatures should consider trying to reestablish some power to
define the practice of law, and the organized bar should reassess
whether it serves the public interest to continue resisting such efforts.

